Cross-source coverage
T1584.001 / ATT&CK
Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
3 rules across 1 source.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant. Adversaries may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account, taking advantage of renewal process gaps, or compromising a cloud service that enables managing domains (e.g., AWS Route53).
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.
Adversaries who compromise a domain may also engage in domain shadowing by creating malicious subdomains under their control while keeping any existing DNS records. As service will not be disrupted, the malicious subdomains may go unnoticed for long periods of time.
- Tactics
- Resource Development
- Platforms
- PRE
- Telemetry
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Domain Name
How MITRE says to detect it DET0863
Detection of Domains
PRE Analytic 1995
Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Consider monitoring for anomalous changes to domain registrant information and/or domain resolution information that may indicate the compromise of a domain. Efforts may need to be tailored to specific domains of interest as benign registration and resolution changes are a common occurrence on the internet. Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. In some cases, abnormal subdomain IP addresses (such as those originating in a different country from the root domain) may indicate a malicious subdomain. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Domain NameNoneDomain NameNoneDomain NameNone
elastic/detection-rules
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Route 53 Domain Transfer Lock Disabled | High | Elastic TOML |
| AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Custom Domain Added or Verified | Low | Elastic TOML |