Cross-source coverage

T1584.002 / ATT&CK

Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server

3 rules across 1 source.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: Application Layer Protocol). Instead of setting up their own DNS servers, adversaries may compromise third-party DNS servers in support of operations.

By compromising DNS servers, adversaries can alter DNS records. Such control can allow for redirection of an organization's traffic, facilitating Collection and Credential Access efforts for the adversary. Additionally, adversaries may leverage such control in conjunction with Digital Certificates to redirect traffic to adversary-controlled infrastructure, mimicking normal trusted network communications. Alternatively, they may be able to prove ownership of a domain to a SaaS service in order to assert control of the service or create a new administrative Cloud Account. Adversaries may also be able to silently create subdomains pointed at malicious servers without tipping off the actual owner of the DNS server.

Platforms
PRE
Telemetry
Domain Name

How MITRE says to detect it DET0891

Detection of DNS Server

PRE Analytic 2023

Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) registry data that may compromise third-party DNS servers that can be used during targeting. Much of this activity will take place outside the visibility of the target organization, making detection of this behavior difficult. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.

  • Domain Name None
  • Domain Name None

Wazuh Core Ruleset

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
Amazon Security Lake - Route 53 - Failed DNS request for a Non-Existent Domain [] "" from . · query.type = \.*, rcode = NXDOMAIN Low Wazuh XML
Amazon Security Lake - Route 53 - Failed DNS request [] "" from . · query.type = \.*, rcode_id = -1 Low Wazuh XML
Amazon Security Lake - Route 53 - Succsessful DNS request [] "" from . · query.type = \.*, rcode = NOERROR Low Wazuh XML

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