Cross-source coverage

T1688 / ATT&CK

Safe Mode Boot

1 rule across 1 source.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may abuse Windows safe mode to disable endpoint defenses. Safe mode starts up the Windows operating system with a limited set of drivers and services. Third-party security software such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools may not start after booting Windows in safe mode. There are two versions of safe mode: Safe Mode and Safe Mode with Networking. It is possible to start additional services after a safe mode boot.

Adversaries may abuse safe mode to disable endpoint defenses that may not start with a limited boot. Hosts can be forced into safe mode after the next reboot via modifications to Boot Configuration Data (BCD) stores, which are files that manage boot application settings.

Adversaries may also add their malicious applications to the list of minimal services that start in safe mode by modifying relevant Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry). Malicious Component Object Model (COM) objects may also be registered and loaded in safe mode.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0116

Detection Strategy for Safe Mode Boot Abuse

Windows Analytic 0323

Abuse of safe mode via BCD modification, boot configuration utilities (bcdedit.exe, bootcfg.exe), and registry persistence under SafeBoot keys. Defender view: suspicious boot configuration changes correlated with registry edits that enable adversary persistence or disable defenses.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13, 14
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=12

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Windows EFI Volume Mount Attempt Via Mountvol Undefined SPL

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.