AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity
Description
Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to all secrets, the ability to create tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC policies. An attacker impersonating system:masters gains full cluster-admin equivalent access, while impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants access to every secret in every namespace and the ability to mint service account tokens for lateral movement.
Query · kuery
data_stream.dataset:aws.eks_audit and
aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(* and not ("eks-event-service:event-controller" or eks\:*)) and
aws.eks.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision:allow and
aws.eks.audit.verb:(create or delete or get or list or patch or update) and
(aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(admin or cluster-admin or kubernetes-admin or "system:admin" or "system:anonymous" or "system:apiserver" or "system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-proxy" or "system:kube-scheduler" or "system:volume-scheduler" or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*) or aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups:(cluster-admin or "system:cluster-admins" or "system:masters")) and
not user.name:("system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-scheduler" or arn\:aws\:iam\:*\:role/aws-service-role* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKS* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKSNodegroup* or eks\:* or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*)
Implementation guide
This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration
into logs-aws.eks_audit-*, where the AWS EKS audit ingest
pipelines normalize each audit record under aws.eks.audit.*.
Enable the audit control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its
CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry
data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit and
cloud.provider: aws before enabling this rule.
Known false positives
- Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation with privileged targets may match if not covered by exclusions. Map expected callers and expand `not user.name` filters as needed for your environment.
Analyst notes
Investigating AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity
Compare the real actor (user.name, groups, source.ip, user_agent.original) with impersonated fields (aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username, aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups). Confirm whether impersonation is authorized for that principal and target identity.
Possible investigation steps
- Review aws.eks.audit.requestURI, aws.eks.audit.verb, and aws.eks.audit.objectRef for the scope of the operation performed while impersonating.
- Determine whether the real user or service account should have impersonate rights against the impersonated user or group; inspect RBAC impersonate verb bindings and any recent changes.
- Correlate with adjacent audit activity (secrets, tokens, RBAC writes, CSR approval) from the same source identity.
- Hunt for repeated impersonation across namespaces or rapid pivoting after the event.
False positive analysis
- Cluster administrators legitimately use
kubectl --as/--as-groupto test RBAC policies or reproduce a user's view of the cluster. Confirm the real actor is an authorized administrator and the activity aligns with a change or support ticket. - Platform tooling such as GitOps controllers, policy engines, multi-tenancy proxies, or identity brokers may impersonate privileged identities by design. If the real actor is a known controller identity, consider adding a scoped exception on user.name rather than on the impersonated identity.
- EKS control-plane components already excluded in the query (eks:*, eks-event-service, service-linked roles) should not fire; if they do, verify the identity format rather than widening the exclusion.
Response and remediation
- Revoke or tighten impersonate permissions for unexpected identities; rotate credentials for any account that may have abused impersonation.
- If unauthorized, treat as cluster-wide credential risk: review secrets exposure, issued tokens, and RBAC drift; engage incident response per policy.