AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity


Description

Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to all secrets, the ability to create tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC policies. An attacker impersonating system:masters gains full cluster-admin equivalent access, while impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants access to every secret in every namespace and the ability to mint service account tokens for lateral movement.

Query · kuery

data_stream.dataset:aws.eks_audit and
aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(* and not ("eks-event-service:event-controller" or eks\:*)) and
aws.eks.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision:allow and
aws.eks.audit.verb:(create or delete or get or list or patch or update) and
(aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(admin or cluster-admin or kubernetes-admin or "system:admin" or "system:anonymous" or "system:apiserver" or "system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-proxy" or "system:kube-scheduler" or "system:volume-scheduler" or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*) or aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups:(cluster-admin or "system:cluster-admins" or "system:masters")) and
not user.name:("system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-scheduler" or arn\:aws\:iam\:*\:role/aws-service-role* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKS* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKSNodegroup* or eks\:* or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*)

Implementation guide

This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration into logs-aws.eks_audit-*, where the AWS EKS audit ingest pipelines normalize each audit record under aws.eks.audit.*.

Enable the audit control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit and cloud.provider: aws before enabling this rule.

Known false positives

  • Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation with privileged targets may match if not covered by exclusions. Map expected callers and expand `not user.name` filters as needed for your environment.

Analyst notes

Investigating AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity

Compare the real actor (user.name, groups, source.ip, user_agent.original) with impersonated fields (aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username, aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups). Confirm whether impersonation is authorized for that principal and target identity.

Possible investigation steps

  • Review aws.eks.audit.requestURI, aws.eks.audit.verb, and aws.eks.audit.objectRef for the scope of the operation performed while impersonating.
  • Determine whether the real user or service account should have impersonate rights against the impersonated user or group; inspect RBAC impersonate verb bindings and any recent changes.
  • Correlate with adjacent audit activity (secrets, tokens, RBAC writes, CSR approval) from the same source identity.
  • Hunt for repeated impersonation across namespaces or rapid pivoting after the event.

False positive analysis

  • Cluster administrators legitimately use kubectl --as / --as-group to test RBAC policies or reproduce a user's view of the cluster. Confirm the real actor is an authorized administrator and the activity aligns with a change or support ticket.
  • Platform tooling such as GitOps controllers, policy engines, multi-tenancy proxies, or identity brokers may impersonate privileged identities by design. If the real actor is a known controller identity, consider adding a scoped exception on user.name rather than on the impersonated identity.
  • EKS control-plane components already excluded in the query (eks:*, eks-event-service, service-linked roles) should not fire; if they do, verify the identity format rather than widening the exclusion.

Response and remediation

  • Revoke or tighten impersonate permissions for unexpected identities; rotate credentials for any account that may have abused impersonation.
  • If unauthorized, treat as cluster-wide credential risk: review secrets exposure, issued tokens, and RBAC drift; engage incident response per policy.
Raw source AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity · Elastic TOML
Esc
Published by elastic/detection-rules ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[metadata]
creation_date = "2026/08/03"
integration = ["aws"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "The AWS integration adds the aws.eks_audit data stream in package 8.9.0, which requires Kibana 9.6.0 or later."
min_stack_version = "9.6.0"
updated_date = "2026/10/20"

[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Detects Kubernetes API requests where a user is impersonating a privileged cluster identity such as
system:kube-controller-manager, system:admin, system:anonymous, or a member of the system:masters group. These
identities have broad cluster-wide permissions including unrestricted access to all secrets, the ability to create
tokens for any service account, schedule pods on any node, and modify RBAC policies. An attacker impersonating
system:masters gains full cluster-admin equivalent access, while impersonating system:kube-controller-manager grants
access to every secret in every namespace and the ability to mint service account tokens for lateral movement.
"""
false_positives = [
    """
    Break-glass admin tooling, security scanners, or approved controllers that legitimately use impersonation with
    privileged targets may match if not covered by exclusions. Map expected callers and expand `not user.name` filters
    as needed for your environment.
    """,
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-aws.eks_audit-*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity"
note = """## Triage and analysis

### Investigating AWS EKS API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity
Compare the real actor (user.name, groups, source.ip, user_agent.original) with impersonated
fields (aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username, aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups). Confirm whether
impersonation is authorized for that principal and target identity.

### Possible investigation steps

- Review aws.eks.audit.requestURI, aws.eks.audit.verb, and aws.eks.audit.objectRef for the scope of the
  operation performed while impersonating.
- Determine whether the real user or service account should have impersonate rights against the impersonated user
  or group; inspect RBAC impersonate verb bindings and any recent changes.
- Correlate with adjacent audit activity (secrets, tokens, RBAC writes, CSR approval) from the same source identity.
- Hunt for repeated impersonation across namespaces or rapid pivoting after the event.

### False positive analysis

- Cluster administrators legitimately use `kubectl --as` / `--as-group` to test RBAC policies or reproduce a user's view of the cluster. Confirm the real actor is an authorized administrator and the activity aligns with a change or support ticket.
- Platform tooling such as GitOps controllers, policy engines, multi-tenancy proxies, or identity brokers may impersonate privileged identities by design. If the real actor is a known controller identity, consider adding a scoped exception on user.name rather than on the impersonated identity.
- EKS control-plane components already excluded in the query (eks:*, eks-event-service, service-linked roles) should not fire; if they do, verify the identity format rather than widening the exclusion.

### Response and remediation

- Revoke or tighten impersonate permissions for unexpected identities; rotate credentials for any account that may
  have abused impersonation.
- If unauthorized, treat as cluster-wide credential risk: review secrets exposure, issued tokens, and RBAC drift;
  engage incident response per policy."""
references = ["https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/authentication/#user-impersonation"]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "292f6a8c-9b61-5fca-b7d1-9a4b42e4bc43"
setup = """This rule reads EKS control-plane audit logs collected by the AWS integration
into `logs-aws.eks_audit-*`, where the AWS EKS audit ingest
pipelines normalize each audit record under `aws.eks.audit.*`.

Enable the `audit` control-plane log type on the EKS cluster, send its
CloudWatch log group through the AWS integration, and confirm events carry
`data_stream.dataset: aws.eks_audit` and
`cloud.provider: aws` before enabling this rule.
"""
severity = "high"
tags = [
    "Domain: Cloud",
    "Domain: Containers",
    "Platform: AWS",
    "Platform: Kubernetes",
    "Data Source: AWS",
    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
    "Data Source: Kubernetes API Server Audit Logs",
    "Service: AWS EKS",
    "Use Case: Threat Detection",
    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
    "Tactic: Defense Evasion",
    "Rule Type: Custom Query (KQL)",
    "Resources: Investigation Guide",
    "Profile: Beta",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"

query = '''
data_stream.dataset:aws.eks_audit and
aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(* and not ("eks-event-service:event-controller" or eks\:*)) and
aws.eks.audit.annotations.authorization_k8s_io/decision:allow and
aws.eks.audit.verb:(create or delete or get or list or patch or update) and
(aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.username:(admin or cluster-admin or kubernetes-admin or "system:admin" or "system:anonymous" or "system:apiserver" or "system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-proxy" or "system:kube-scheduler" or "system:volume-scheduler" or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*) or aws.eks.audit.impersonatedUser.groups:(cluster-admin or "system:cluster-admins" or "system:masters")) and
not user.name:("system:kube-controller-manager" or "system:kube-scheduler" or arn\:aws\:iam\:*\:role/aws-service-role* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKS* or arn\:aws\:sts\:*\:assumed-role/AWSServiceRoleForAmazonEKSNodegroup* or eks\:* or system\:node\:* or system\:serviceaccount\:kube-system\:*)
'''


[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1134"
name = "Access Token Manipulation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/"


[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.