Cross-source coverage

T1134 / ATT&CK

Access Token Manipulation

98 rules · 94 families across 8 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.

An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.

Any standard user can use the runas command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:SysmonETW:Token

How MITRE says to detect it DET0283

Behavior-chain detection for T1134 Access Token Manipulation on Windows

Windows Analytic 0786

Detection of suspicious token manipulation chains: use of token-related APIs (e.g., LogonUser, DuplicateTokenEx) or commands (runas) → spawning of a new process under a different security context (e.g., SYSTEM) → mismatched parent-child process lineage or anomalies in Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) token/PPID data → abnormal lateral or privilege escalation activity.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4672, 4634
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=10
  • ETW:Token token_analysis: API calls such as DuplicateTokenEx or ImpersonateLoggedOnUser
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=5136

Sub-techniques with coverage

Counted in the 98 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.


elastic/detection-rules

21 rules
Detection Severity Format
Credential Manipulation - Detected - Elastic Endgame High Elastic TOML
GKE API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity High Elastic TOML
Interactive Logon by an Unusual Process High Elastic TOML
Kubernetes API Request Impersonating Privileged Identity High Elastic TOML
Parent Process PID Spoofing High Elastic TOML
Permission Theft - Detected - Elastic Endgame High Elastic TOML
Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation High Elastic TOML
Privilege Escalation via Rogue Named Pipe Impersonation High Elastic TOML
Privileges Elevation via Parent Process PID Spoofing High Elastic TOML
Process Created with an Elevated Token High Elastic TOML

+ 11 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/protections-artifacts

20 rules
Detection Severity Format
Access Token Manipulation via Child Process Undefined Elastic TOML
API Call from a Process with a Spoofed Parent Undefined Elastic TOML
Debug Privilege Enabled by a Low Reputation Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Execution via Interactive Secondary Logon Undefined Elastic TOML
NetworkCleartext Logon by a Suspicious Process Undefined Elastic TOML
NewCredential Logon by a Suspicious Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Parent Process PID Spoofing Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Execution via Token Theft Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Parent Process PID Spoofing via MalSecLogon Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential Privilege Escalation via Rogue WinRM Undefined Elastic TOML

+ 10 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity

SigmaHQ/sigma

18 rules
Detection Severity Format
HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe Critical Sigma
HackTool - NoFilter Execution High Sigma
HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution High Sigma
HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution High Sigma
HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution High Sigma
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security High Sigma
Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - System High Sigma
Potential Meterpreter/CobaltStrike Activity High Sigma
PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution High Sigma
RedSun - Conhost.exe Spawned by TieringEngineService.exe High Sigma

+ 8 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity

splunk/security_content

15 rules
Detection Severity Format
Runas Execution in CommandLine Undefined SPL
Windows Access Token Manipulation SeDebugPrivilege Undefined SPL
Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle Undefined SPL
Windows Access Token Winlogon Duplicate Handle In Uncommon Path Undefined SPL
Windows AD Cross Domain SID History Addition Undefined SPL
Windows AD Privileged Account SID History Addition Undefined SPL
Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition Undefined SPL
Windows AD SID History Attribute Modified Undefined SPL
Windows Handle Duplication in Known UAC-Bypass Binaries Undefined SPL
Windows Parent PID Spoofing with Explorer Undefined SPL

+ 5 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

11 rules · 10 families
Detection Severity Format
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · win.eventdata.commandLine = (?i)-k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -pass Critical Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · BadPotato Execution (T1134.001) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Create Process with Token - cmd.exe from LSASS token (T1134.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Empire Token Duplication (T1134.001) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Mimikatz SID-History Injection (T1134.005) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Named Pipe Client Impersonation (T1134.001) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · NSudo Execution (T1134.001) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Unusual Parent for PowerShell (T1134.001) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Access Token Manipulation (T1134) 2 variants Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Access Token Manipulation (T1134) 2 variants Low Wazuh XML

+ 1 more from socfortress/Wazuh-Rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

6 rules
Detection Severity Format
All BlackCat/ALPHV Ransomware IOCs with one KQL query Undefined KQL
Encoded Powershell Commands With Web Request Undefined KQL
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Undefined KQL
Process Primary Token Elevated to SeDebugPrivilege Undefined KQL
Runas with saved credentials Undefined KQL
Sliver C2 Beacon Loaded Undefined KQL

panther-labs/panther-analysis

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
GitHub pull_request_target Workflow on Self-Hosted Runner High Panther Python
GitHub pull_request_target Workflow Usage High Panther Python
GitHub Artifact Download from Cross-Fork Workflow Medium Panther Python
GitHub pull_request_target Workflow with Checkout Action Medium Panther Python
GitHub Cross-Fork Workflow Run Informational Panther Python

Azure/Azure-Sentinel

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Possible Resource-Based Constrained Delegation Abuse Medium KQL
Service Principal Name (SPN) Assigned to User Account Medium KQL

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.