Suspicious Command and Control via Internet Explorer


Description

Identifies instances of Internet Explorer being started via the Component Object Model (COM) from an unusual caller such as scripting interpreters or RunDLL32. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions.

Query · eql

sequence with maxspan=5m

 [process where event.action == "start" and
  (
   process.name : ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "mshta.exe",
                   "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe") or
   process.pe.original_file_name : ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe",
                                    "mshta.exe", "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe")
  ) and

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.args : ("\\\\*", "?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")) and
  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
       process.args : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetcpl.cpl",
                       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\LogiLDA.dll,LogiFetch",
                       "inetcpl.cpl,,?")) and
  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.working_directory : "\\\\*") and 

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and 
       process.command_line : ("*\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*", "*\\Users\\*\\OneDrive*")) and

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.args : "C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\wtsp\\systemtasks\\*.vbs" and process.parent.name : "svchost.exe") and

  not (process.name : "mshta.exe" and process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.hta", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.hta", "?:\\PROGRA~?\\*")) and
  not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files\\AppSense\\Environment Manager\\Agent\\EmUser.exe")
  ] by process.entity_id

 [process where event.action == "start" and process.name : "ielowutil.exe" and

  /* ProgId - InternetExplorer.Application.1 */
  process.args : "-CLSID:{0002DF01-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"] by process.Ext.effective_parent.entity_id
Raw source Suspicious Command and Control via Internet Explorer · Elastic TOML
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Published by elastic/protections-artifacts ↗, licensed under Elastic License 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
[rule]
description = """
Identifies instances of Internet Explorer being started via the Component Object Model (COM) from an unusual caller such
as scripting interpreters or RunDLL32. Adversaries could abuse Internet Explorer via COM to avoid suspicious processes
making network connections and bypass host-based firewall restrictions.
"""
id = "5e9fdd8b-5412-483c-a2e6-58de59990ae6"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Command and Control via Internet Explorer"
os_list = ["windows"]
reference = ["https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/new-variant-of-ursnif-continuously-targeting-italy"]
version = "1.0.31"

query = '''
sequence with maxspan=5m

 [process where event.action == "start" and
  (
   process.name : ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe", "mshta.exe",
                   "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe") or
   process.pe.original_file_name : ("regsvr32.exe", "rundll32.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "powershell.exe",
                                    "mshta.exe", "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe")
  ) and

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.args : ("\\\\*", "?:\\Program Files\\*", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*")) and
  not (process.name : "rundll32.exe" and
       process.args : ("?:\\Windows\\System32\\inetcpl.cpl",
                       "?:\\Windows\\System32\\LogiLDA.dll,LogiFetch",
                       "inetcpl.cpl,,?")) and
  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.working_directory : "\\\\*") and 

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and 
       process.command_line : ("*\\Users\\*\\Desktop\\*", "*\\Users\\*\\OneDrive*")) and

  not (process.name : "wscript.exe" and process.args : "C:\\inetpub\\wwwroot\\wtsp\\systemtasks\\*.vbs" and process.parent.name : "svchost.exe") and

  not (process.name : "mshta.exe" and process.args : ("?:\\Program Files\\*.hta", "?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.hta", "?:\\PROGRA~?\\*")) and
  not (process.name : "cscript.exe" and process.parent.executable : "C:\\Program Files\\AppSense\\Environment Manager\\Agent\\EmUser.exe")
  ] by process.entity_id

 [process where event.action == "start" and process.name : "ielowutil.exe" and

  /* ProgId - InternetExplorer.Application.1 */
  process.args : "-CLSID:{0002DF01-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"] by process.Ext.effective_parent.entity_id
'''

min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"
[[actions]]
action = "kill_process"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[optional_actions]]
action = "rollback"
field = "process.entity_id"
state = 0

[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.005"
name = "Visual Basic"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/005/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.007"
name = "JavaScript"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/007/"


[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1559"
name = "Inter-Process Communication"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1559.001"
name = "Component Object Model"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1218"
name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.005"
name = "Mshta"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.010"
name = "Regsvr32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010/"

[[threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1218.011"
name = "Rundll32"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"



[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
[[threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1071"
name = "Application Layer Protocol"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/"

[[threat.technique]]
id = "T1102"
name = "Web Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1102/"


[threat.tactic]
id = "TA0011"
name = "Command and Control"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"

[internal]
min_endpoint_version = "8.4.0"

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