Cross-source coverage
T1559.001 / ATT&CK
Inter-Process Communication: Component Object Model
21 rules across 6 sources.
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may use the Windows Component Object Model (COM) for local code execution. COM is an inter-process communication (IPC) component of the native Windows application programming interface (API) that enables interaction between software objects, or executable code that implements one or more interfaces. Through COM, a client object can call methods of server objects, which are typically binary Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) or executables (EXE). Remote COM execution is facilitated by Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM).
Various COM interfaces are exposed that can be abused to invoke arbitrary execution via a variety of programming languages such as C, C++, Java, and Visual Basic. Specific COM objects also exist to directly perform functions beyond code execution, such as creating a Scheduled Task/Job, fileless download/execution, and other adversary behaviors related to privilege escalation and persistence.
- Tactics
- Execution
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Security
How MITRE says to detect it DET0224
Detect Abuse of Component Object Model (T1559.001)
Windows Analytic 0628
Detects anomalous use of COM objects for execution, such as Office applications spawning scripting engines, enumeration of COM interfaces via registry queries, or processes loading atypical DLLs through COM activation. Correlates process creation, module loads, and registry queries to flag suspicious COM-based code execution or persistence.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=7WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4663, 4670, 4656
elastic/detection-rules
12 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement via MSHTA | High | Elastic TOML |
| Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with MMC | High | Elastic TOML |
| UAC Bypass Attempt with IEditionUpgradeManager Elevated COM Interface | High | Elastic TOML |
| UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM Interface | High | Elastic TOML |
| Execution of COM object via Xwizard | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Incoming DCOM Lateral Movement with ShellBrowserWindow or ShellWindows | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Command and Control via Internet Explorer | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Explorer Child Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Inter-Process Communication via Outlook | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 2 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
SigmaHQ/sigma
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| CMSTP Execution Process Access | High | Sigma |
| Dllhost.EXE Initiated Network Connection To Non-Local IP Address | Medium | Sigma |
| DNS Query Request By Regsvr32.EXE | Medium | Sigma |
| Network Connection Initiated By Regsvr32.EXE | Medium | Sigma |
elastic/protections-artifacts
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious Command and Control via Internet Explorer | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Windows Component Object Model via DLLHOST | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
Azure/Azure-Sentinel
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| detect-impacket-dcomexec | Undefined | KQL |
Wazuh Core Ruleset
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Office application invoked Verclsid.exe, possible COM payload execution | High | Wazuh XML |
splunk/security_content
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Process Writing DynamicWrapperX | Undefined | SPL |