Decoy Document Creation via Curl
Description
Detects when Curl is seen creating a .pdf or .doc file in a suspicious directory like /tmp or /users/shared. A recent DPRK sample was seen downloading a decoy document via Curl like this.
Query · eql
sequence by process.entity_id with maxspan=1m
[process where event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and process.name in ("curl", "nscurl")]
[file where event.action == "modification" and file.path like ("/tmp/*", "/private/tmp/*", "/Users/Shared/*", "/Users/*/Library/*") and
file.extension in ("pdf", "doc") and process.name in ("curl", "nscurl") and
not Effective_process.executable like~ (
"/Applications/Cursor.app/Contents/MacOS/Cursor",
"/Applications/Codex.app/Contents/MacOS/*",
"/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/MacOS/ChatGPT",
"/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/MacOS/Code",
"/Users/*/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude-code/*/claude.app/Contents/MacOS/claude",
"/Applications/Visual Studio Code.app/Contents/MacOS/Electron",
"/Users/*/.local/share/claude/versions/*"
) and not
(Effective_process.executable like "/Applications/Microsoft Word.app/Contents/MacOS/Microsoft Word" and
file.path like "/Users/*/Library/Containers/com.microsoft.Word/Data/tmp/Content.MSO/*") and
not file.path like "/private/tmp/claude*"]