Cross-source coverage
T1204 / ATT&CK
User Execution
293 rules · 287 families across 12 sources.
45 deprecated hidden · include 3 atomic-IOC hidden · include
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.
While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.
Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:
- Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary
- Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies
- Downloading and executing malware for User Execution
- Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually
For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.
- Tactics
- Execution
- Platforms
- Linux · Windows · macOS · IaaS · Containers
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:ApplicationWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securitylinux:syslogauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlogfs:fileeventsmacos:osquerydocker:eventsAWS:CloudTrailgcp:vpcflow
How MITRE says to detect it DET0478
User Execution – multi-surface behavior chain (documents/links → helper/unpacker → LOLBIN/child → egress)
Windows Analytic 1314
Cause→effect chain: (1) User-facing app (Office/PDF/archiver/browser) records an open/click or abnormal event, then (2) a downloaded file is created in a user-writable path and/or decompressed, (3) the parent user app spawns a living-off-the-land binary (e.g., powershell/cmd/mshta/rundll32/msiexec/wscript/expand/zip) or installer, and (4) immediate outbound HTTP(S)/DNS/SMB from the same lineage.
WinEventLog:ApplicationEventCode=1000WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4688WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22
Linux Analytic 1315
Cause→effect chain: (1) User app/browser/archiver logs an open/click or abnormal exit, (2) new executable/script/archive extracted into $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or ~/.cache, (3) parent app spawns shell/interpreter (bash/sh/python/node/curl/wget) or desktop file, and (4) new outbound connection(s) from the child lineage.
linux:syslogopened document|clicked link|segfault|abnormal termination|sandboxauditd:SYSCALLopenauditd:SYSCALLcreatauditd:SYSCALLrename,chmodauditd:SYSCALLexecveNSM:Flownew outbound connection from browser/office lineage
macOS Analytic 1316
Cause→effect chain: (1) unified logs show application open/click or crash for Safari/Chrome/Office/Preview/archiver, (2) file write/extraction into ~/Downloads, /private/var/folders/* or ~/Library, (3) parent app spawns osascript/bash/zsh/curl/python or opens a quarantined app with Gatekeeper prompts, (4) network egress from child.
macos:unifiedlogopened document|clicked link|EXC_BAD_ACCESS|abort|LSQuarantinefs:fileeventscreate/write/rename in user-writable pathsmacos:osqueryexecNSM:Flownew outbound connection from exploited lineage
Containers Analytic 1317
Cause→effect chain in CI/dev desktops: (1) user triggers container run/pull after opening a doc/link/script, (2) newly created image/container uses unexpected external registry or entrypoint, (3) container starts and immediately egresses to suspicious destinations.
docker:eventscreated,started: new container from untrusted registry or unexpected entrypointdocker:eventsstartNSM:Flowcontainer egress to unknown IPs/domains
IaaS Analytic 1318
Cause→effect chain in cloud consoles: (1) user clicks link then invokes instance/image creation via API, (2) instance/image originates from external AMI or unknown image, (3) instance immediately egresses or retrieves payloads.
AWS:CloudTrailRunInstances,CreateImageAWS:CloudTrailStartInstancesgcp:vpcflowfirst 5m egress to unknown ASNs
Sub-techniques with coverage
Counted in the 293 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.
splunk/security_content
65 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours | Undefined | SPL |
| ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User | Undefined | SPL |
| AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode | Undefined | SPL |
| Batch File Write to System32 | Undefined | SPL |
| Cisco Isovalent - Non Allowlisted Image Use | Undefined | SPL |
+ 55 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/protections-artifacts
56 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Attempt to Mount a Remote WebDav Share | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Base64 or Xxd Decode Argument Evasion | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Base64 Shebang Payload Decoded via Built-in Utility | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Command Shell Execution from Untrusted Origin | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Decoded or Decrypted Payload Written to Suspicious Directory | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Decoy Document Creation via Curl | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Decoy file Open via Preview App | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Disk Image Download and Mount via Hdiutil | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| DLL Loaded from WebDav Share | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
+ 46 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity
SigmaHQ/sigma
55 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| DarkSide Ransomware Pattern | Critical | Sigma |
| Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882 | Critical | Sigma |
| Exploit for CVE-2017-8759 | Critical | Sigma |
| Potential Maze Ransomware Activity | Critical | Sigma |
| PrinterNightmare Mimikatz Driver Name | Critical | Sigma |
| Antivirus - Hacktool Signature | High | Sigma |
| FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths | High | Sigma |
| File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application | High | Sigma |
| GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications | High | Sigma |
| HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection | High | Sigma |
+ 45 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/detection-rules
52 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter | High | Elastic TOML |
| Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter Detected via Defend for Containers | High | Elastic TOML |
| Elastic Defend Alert Followed by Telemetry Loss | High | Elastic TOML |
| Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office | High | Elastic TOML |
| Gatekeeper Override and Execution | High | Elastic TOML |
| Google Workspace Object Copied from External Drive with App Consent | High | Elastic TOML |
| Ingress Tool Transfer Followed by Execution and Deletion Detected via Defend for Containers | High | Elastic TOML |
| Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Execution via FileFix Phishing Attack | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Fake CAPTCHA Phishing Attack | High | Elastic TOML |
+ 42 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
20 rules · 17 families+ 10 more from socfortress/Wazuh-Rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
panther-labs/panther-analysis
12 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Slack Potentially Malicious File Shared | Critical | Panther Python |
| Gsuite Attachments Downloaded from Spam Email | High | Panther Python |
| Gsuite Link Clicked in Spam Email | High | Panther Python |
| Malicious Content Detected | High | Panther Python |
| Malware Detected in Email | High | Panther Python |
| Proofpoint Active Threat Campaign Detected | High | Panther Python |
| Proofpoint Malware Detected | High | Panther Python |
| Proofpoint Multiple Threats Detected | High | Panther Python |
| Proofpoint Virus Detected | High | Panther Python |
| AppOmni Alert Passthrough | Medium | Panther Python |
+ 2 more from panther-labs/panther-analysis → showing the 10 highest-severity
Azure/Azure-Sentinel
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility | Medium | KQL |
| Rare firewall rule changes using netsh | Low | KQL |
| Discord download invoked from cmd line (ASIM Version) | Undefined | KQL |
| Email containing malware accessed on a unmanaged device | Undefined | KQL |
| Gentlemen Ransomware payload execution and staging | Undefined | KQL |
| LockBit and related tool hash IoCs | Undefined | KQL |
| Rare Domains in External Teams Messages | Undefined | KQL |
| RunMRU with non-ASCII characters | Undefined | KQL |
| VMWare-LPE-2022-22960 | Undefined | KQL |
Wazuh Core Ruleset
7 ruleschainguard-dev/osquery-defense-kit
7 rules · 6 families| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Catch programs that failed to run due to a launch constraint violation, such as a signing issue. | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Look for sketchy mounted disk images, inspired by Shlayer 2 variants | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Look for sketchy mounted disk images, inspired by Shlayer 2 variants | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Scan removable volumes for sketchy files | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Surface ISO/DMG disk images that were downloaded from unexpected places | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Unexpected process that spawns shell processes (event based) | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Unexpected process that spawns shell processes (event-based) | Undefined | osquery SQL |
chronicle/detection-rules
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| aws_guardduty_malicious_or_suspicious_file_executed | High | YARA-L |
| aws_successful_api_from_tor_exit_node | High | YARA-L |
| gcp_successful_api_from_tor_exit_node | High | YARA-L |
| high_risk_user_download_executable_from_macro | High | YARA-L |
| google_workspace_malicious_file_downloaded | Medium | YARA-L |
Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| File that contains malware detected by Defender For Cloud Apps | Undefined | KQL |
| Malicious PowerShell Executions From Clipboard Copy-and-Paste | Undefined | KQL |
| Malware File Detected In Office 365 | Undefined | KQL |
| MITRE ATT&CK Mapping | Undefined | KQL |
falcosecurity/rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Program run with disallowed http proxy env | Low | Falco YAML |