Cross-source coverage

T1204 / ATT&CK

User Execution

293 rules · 287 families across 12 sources.

45 deprecated hidden · include 3 atomic-IOC hidden · include

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing.

While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing.

Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as:

  • Enabling Remote Access Tools, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary
  • Running malicious JavaScript in their browser, allowing adversaries to Steal Web Session Cookies
  • Downloading and executing malware for User Execution
  • Coerceing users to copy, paste, and execute malicious code manually

For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Tools.

Tactics
Execution
Platforms
Linux · Windows · macOS · IaaS · Containers
Telemetry
WinEventLog:ApplicationWinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securitylinux:syslogauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlogfs:fileeventsmacos:osquerydocker:eventsAWS:CloudTrailgcp:vpcflow

How MITRE says to detect it DET0478

User Execution – multi-surface behavior chain (documents/links → helper/unpacker → LOLBIN/child → egress)

Windows Analytic 1314

Cause→effect chain: (1) User-facing app (Office/PDF/archiver/browser) records an open/click or abnormal event, then (2) a downloaded file is created in a user-writable path and/or decompressed, (3) the parent user app spawns a living-off-the-land binary (e.g., powershell/cmd/mshta/rundll32/msiexec/wscript/expand/zip) or installer, and (4) immediate outbound HTTP(S)/DNS/SMB from the same lineage.

  • WinEventLog:Application EventCode=1000
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=3, 22

Linux Analytic 1315

Cause→effect chain: (1) User app/browser/archiver logs an open/click or abnormal exit, (2) new executable/script/archive extracted into $HOME/Downloads, /tmp, or ~/.cache, (3) parent app spawns shell/interpreter (bash/sh/python/node/curl/wget) or desktop file, and (4) new outbound connection(s) from the child lineage.

  • linux:syslog opened document|clicked link|segfault|abnormal termination|sandbox
  • auditd:SYSCALL open
  • auditd:SYSCALL creat
  • auditd:SYSCALL rename,chmod
  • auditd:SYSCALL execve
  • NSM:Flow new outbound connection from browser/office lineage

macOS Analytic 1316

Cause→effect chain: (1) unified logs show application open/click or crash for Safari/Chrome/Office/Preview/archiver, (2) file write/extraction into ~/Downloads, /private/var/folders/* or ~/Library, (3) parent app spawns osascript/bash/zsh/curl/python or opens a quarantined app with Gatekeeper prompts, (4) network egress from child.

  • macos:unifiedlog opened document|clicked link|EXC_BAD_ACCESS|abort|LSQuarantine
  • fs:fileevents create/write/rename in user-writable paths
  • macos:osquery exec
  • NSM:Flow new outbound connection from exploited lineage

Containers Analytic 1317

Cause→effect chain in CI/dev desktops: (1) user triggers container run/pull after opening a doc/link/script, (2) newly created image/container uses unexpected external registry or entrypoint, (3) container starts and immediately egresses to suspicious destinations.

  • docker:events created,started: new container from untrusted registry or unexpected entrypoint
  • docker:events start
  • NSM:Flow container egress to unknown IPs/domains

IaaS Analytic 1318

Cause→effect chain in cloud consoles: (1) user clicks link then invokes instance/image creation via API, (2) instance/image originates from external AMI or unknown image, (3) instance immediately egresses or retrieves payloads.

  • AWS:CloudTrail RunInstances,CreateImage
  • AWS:CloudTrail StartInstances
  • gcp:vpcflow first 5m egress to unknown ASNs

Sub-techniques with coverage

Counted in the 293 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.


splunk/security_content

65 rules
Detection Severity Format
ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours Undefined SPL
ASL AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User Undefined SPL
AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings High Undefined SPL
AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Low Informational Unknown Undefined SPL
AWS ECR Container Scanning Findings Medium Undefined SPL
AWS ECR Container Upload Outside Business Hours Undefined SPL
AWS ECR Container Upload Unknown User Undefined SPL
AWS Lambda UpdateFunctionCode Undefined SPL
Batch File Write to System32 Undefined SPL
Cisco Isovalent - Non Allowlisted Image Use Undefined SPL

+ 55 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/protections-artifacts

56 rules
Detection Severity Format
Attempt to Mount a Remote WebDav Share Undefined Elastic TOML
Base64 or Xxd Decode Argument Evasion Undefined Elastic TOML
Base64 Shebang Payload Decoded via Built-in Utility Undefined Elastic TOML
Command Shell Execution from Untrusted Origin Undefined Elastic TOML
Decoded or Decrypted Payload Written to Suspicious Directory Undefined Elastic TOML
Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter Undefined Elastic TOML
Decoy Document Creation via Curl Undefined Elastic TOML
Decoy file Open via Preview App Undefined Elastic TOML
Disk Image Download and Mount via Hdiutil Undefined Elastic TOML
DLL Loaded from WebDav Share Undefined Elastic TOML

+ 46 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity

SigmaHQ/sigma

55 rules
Detection Severity Format
DarkSide Ransomware Pattern Critical Sigma
Droppers Exploiting CVE-2017-11882 Critical Sigma
Exploit for CVE-2017-8759 Critical Sigma
Potential Maze Ransomware Activity Critical Sigma
PrinterNightmare Mimikatz Driver Name Critical Sigma
Antivirus - Hacktool Signature High Sigma
FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths High Sigma
File With Uncommon Extension Created By An Office Application High Sigma
GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications High Sigma
HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection High Sigma

+ 45 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/detection-rules

52 rules
Detection Severity Format
Base64 Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter High Elastic TOML
Decoded Payload Piped to Interpreter Detected via Defend for Containers High Elastic TOML
Elastic Defend Alert Followed by Telemetry Loss High Elastic TOML
Execution of File Written or Modified by Microsoft Office High Elastic TOML
Gatekeeper Override and Execution High Elastic TOML
Google Workspace Object Copied from External Drive with App Consent High Elastic TOML
Ingress Tool Transfer Followed by Execution and Deletion Detected via Defend for Containers High Elastic TOML
Microsoft Build Engine Started by an Office Application High Elastic TOML
Potential Execution via FileFix Phishing Attack High Elastic TOML
Potential Fake CAPTCHA Phishing Attack High Elastic TOML

+ 42 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

20 rules · 17 families
Detection Severity Format
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Encoded PowerShell from Office (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Excel launching CMD (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Office launching cscript (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Office launching explorer (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Office launching headless Chrome (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Office launching mshta (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Office spawning WScript (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Suspicious LNK File Execution (T1204.002) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · win.eventdata.parentImage = winword.exe$|excel.exe$|powerpnt.exe 3 variants High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · win.eventdata.parentImage = winword.exe$|excel.exe$|powerpnt.exe 3 variants High Wazuh XML

+ 10 more from socfortress/Wazuh-Rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

panther-labs/panther-analysis

12 rules
Detection Severity Format
Slack Potentially Malicious File Shared Critical Panther Python
Gsuite Attachments Downloaded from Spam Email High Panther Python
Gsuite Link Clicked in Spam Email High Panther Python
Malicious Content Detected High Panther Python
Malware Detected in Email High Panther Python
Proofpoint Active Threat Campaign Detected High Panther Python
Proofpoint Malware Detected High Panther Python
Proofpoint Multiple Threats Detected High Panther Python
Proofpoint Virus Detected High Panther Python
AppOmni Alert Passthrough Medium Panther Python

+ 2 more from panther-labs/panther-analysis → showing the 10 highest-severity

Azure/Azure-Sentinel

9 rules
Detection Severity Format
Audit policy manipulation using auditpol utility Medium KQL
Rare firewall rule changes using netsh Low KQL
Discord download invoked from cmd line (ASIM Version) Undefined KQL
Email containing malware accessed on a unmanaged device Undefined KQL
Gentlemen Ransomware payload execution and staging Undefined KQL
LockBit and related tool hash IoCs Undefined KQL
Rare Domains in External Teams Messages Undefined KQL
RunMRU with non-ASCII characters Undefined KQL
VMWare-LPE-2022-22960 Undefined KQL

Wazuh Core Ruleset

7 rules
Detection Severity Format
Executed suspicious process with right to left override character in binary file, possible malicious file masquerading Critical Wazuh XML
MS Graph message: Indicators that the system is infected with malware have been detected. Critical Wazuh XML
MS Graph message: Malware has been detected in the environment. This is a true positive alert. Critical Wazuh XML
Auditd: Execution of a file ended abnormally. High Wazuh XML
Cmd.exe executed from non-standard directory, may be related to link execution from mounted ISO file High Wazuh XML
MS Graph message: Indicators that the system is potentially infected with malware have been detected. Check the system for signs of infection. High Wazuh XML
Rundll32 executed from non-standard directory, may be related to link execution from mounted ISO file High Wazuh XML

chainguard-dev/osquery-defense-kit

7 rules · 6 families
Detection Severity Format
Catch programs that failed to run due to a launch constraint violation, such as a signing issue. Undefined osquery SQL
Look for sketchy mounted disk images, inspired by Shlayer 2 variants Undefined osquery SQL
Look for sketchy mounted disk images, inspired by Shlayer 2 variants Undefined osquery SQL
Scan removable volumes for sketchy files Undefined osquery SQL
Surface ISO/DMG disk images that were downloaded from unexpected places Undefined osquery SQL
Unexpected process that spawns shell processes (event based) Undefined osquery SQL
Unexpected process that spawns shell processes (event-based) Undefined osquery SQL

chronicle/detection-rules

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
aws_guardduty_malicious_or_suspicious_file_executed High YARA-L
aws_successful_api_from_tor_exit_node High YARA-L
gcp_successful_api_from_tor_exit_node High YARA-L
high_risk_user_download_executable_from_macro High YARA-L
google_workspace_malicious_file_downloaded Medium YARA-L

Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
File that contains malware detected by Defender For Cloud Apps Undefined KQL
Malicious PowerShell Executions From Clipboard Copy-and-Paste Undefined KQL
Malware File Detected In Office 365 Undefined KQL
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Undefined KQL

falcosecurity/rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Program run with disallowed http proxy env Low Falco YAML

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