Malicious Driver Load By Name


Description

Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.

Query · sigma

selection:
  ImageLoaded|endswith:
  - \wfshbr64.sys
  - \ktmutil7odm.sys
  - \ktes.sys
  - \a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys
  - \kt2.sys
  - \4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys
  - \malicious.sys
  - \a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys
  - \spwizimgvt.sys
  - \c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys
  - \fur.sys
  - \wantd.sys
  - \windbg.sys
  - \4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys
  - \gmer64.sys
  - \1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys
  - \poortry2.sys
  - \wintapix.sys
  - \daxin_blank6.sys
  - \6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys
  - \blacklotus_driver.sys
  - \air_system10.sys
  - \dkrtk.sys
  - \7.sys
  - \sense5ext.sys
  - \ktgn.sys
  - \ndislan.sys
  - \nlslexicons0024uvn.sys
  - \be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys
  - \4.sys
  - \wantd_2.sys
  - \e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys
  - \daxin_blank3.sys
  - \gftkyj64.sys
  - \daxin_blank2.sys
  - \wantd_4.sys
  - \reddriver.sys
  - \834761775.sys
  - \mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys
  - \mjj0ge.sys
  - \daxin_blank.sys
  - \daxin_blank5.sys
  - \poortry1.sys
  - \msqpq.sys
  - \mimidrv.sys
  - \e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys
  - \prokiller64.sys
  - \nodedriver.sys
  - \wantd_3.sys
  - \lctka.sys
  - \kapchelper_x64.sys
  - \daxin_blank4.sys
  - \a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys
  - \wantd_6.sys
  - \ntbios.sys
  - \wantd_5.sys
  - \pciecubed.sys
  - \mimikatz.sys
  - \nqrmq.sys
  - \2.sys
  - \poortry.sys
  - \ntbios_2.sys
  - \fgme.sys
  - \telephonuafy.sys
  - \typelibde.sys
  - \daxin_blank1.sys
  - \ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys
  - \5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys
condition: selection

Known false positives

  • False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version.
  • If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible)
Raw source Malicious Driver Load By Name · Sigma
Esc
Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Malicious Driver Load By Name
id: 39b64854-5497-4b57-a448-40977b8c9679
status: test
description: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.
references:
    - https://loldrivers.io/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-10-03
modified: 2023-12-02
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1543.003
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: driver_load
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith:
            - '\wfshbr64.sys'
            - '\ktmutil7odm.sys'
            - '\ktes.sys'
            - '\a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys'
            - '\kt2.sys'
            - '\4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys'
            - '\malicious.sys'
            - '\a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys'
            - '\spwizimgvt.sys'
            - '\c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys'
            - '\fur.sys'
            - '\wantd.sys'
            - '\windbg.sys'
            - '\4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys'
            - '\gmer64.sys'
            - '\1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys'
            - '\poortry2.sys'
            - '\wintapix.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank6.sys'
            - '\6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys'
            - '\blacklotus_driver.sys'
            - '\air_system10.sys'
            - '\dkrtk.sys'
            - '\7.sys'
            - '\sense5ext.sys'
            - '\ktgn.sys'
            - '\ndislan.sys'
            - '\nlslexicons0024uvn.sys'
            - '\be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys'
            - '\4.sys'
            - '\wantd_2.sys'
            - '\e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank3.sys'
            - '\gftkyj64.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank2.sys'
            - '\wantd_4.sys'
            - '\reddriver.sys'
            - '\834761775.sys'
            - '\mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys'
            - '\mjj0ge.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank5.sys'
            - '\poortry1.sys'
            - '\msqpq.sys'
            - '\mimidrv.sys'
            - '\e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys'
            - '\prokiller64.sys'
            - '\nodedriver.sys'
            - '\wantd_3.sys'
            - '\lctka.sys'
            - '\kapchelper_x64.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank4.sys'
            - '\a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys'
            - '\wantd_6.sys'
            - '\ntbios.sys'
            - '\wantd_5.sys'
            - '\pciecubed.sys'
            - '\mimikatz.sys'
            - '\nqrmq.sys'
            - '\2.sys'
            - '\poortry.sys'
            - '\ntbios_2.sys'
            - '\fgme.sys'
            - '\telephonuafy.sys'
            - '\typelibde.sys'
            - '\daxin_blank1.sys'
            - '\ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys'
            - '\5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version.
    - If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible)
level: medium

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