Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS


Description

Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks. This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature.

Query · sigma

selection:
  TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe
  GrantedAccess|contains:
  - '0x1038'
  - '0x1438'
  - '0x143a'
  - '0x1fffff'
  CallTrace|contains:
  - dbgcore.dll
  - dbghelp.dll
  - kernel32.dll
  - kernelbase.dll
  - ntdll.dll
filter_main_system_user:
  SourceUser|contains:
  - AUTHORI
  - AUTORI
filter_optional_thor:
  CallTrace|contains|all:
  - :\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
  - \thor\thor64.exe+
  - '|UNKNOWN('
  GrantedAccess: '0x103800'
filter_optional_sysmon:
  SourceImage|endswith:
  - :\Windows\Sysmon64.exe
  - :\Windows\Sysmon64a.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Known false positives

  • Unknown
Raw source Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Potential Credential Dumping Activity Via LSASS
id: 5ef9853e-4d0e-4a70-846f-a9ca37d876da
status: test
description: |
    Detects process access requests to the LSASS process with specific call trace calls and access masks.
    This behaviour is expressed by many credential dumping tools such as Mimikatz, NanoDump, Invoke-Mimikatz, Procdump and even the Taskmgr dumping feature.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329170326/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-21-procdump-or-taskmgr.html
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md
    - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/windows_possible_credential_dumping/
author: Samir Bousseaden, Michael Haag
date: 2019-04-03
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
    - attack.s0002
logsource:
    category: process_access
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
        GrantedAccess|contains:
            - '0x1038'
            - '0x1438'
            - '0x143a'
            - '0x1fffff' # Too many false positives
            # - '0x01000'  # Too many false positives
            # - '0x1010'   # Too many false positives
            # - '0x1400'  # Too many false positives
            # - '0x1410' # Too many false positives
            # - '0x40'   # Too many false positives
        CallTrace|contains:
            - 'dbgcore.dll'
            - 'dbghelp.dll'
            - 'kernel32.dll'
            - 'kernelbase.dll'
            - 'ntdll.dll'
    filter_main_system_user:
        SourceUser|contains: # Covers many language settings
            - 'AUTHORI'
            - 'AUTORI'
    filter_optional_thor:
        CallTrace|contains|all:
            - ':\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
            - '\thor\thor64.exe+'
            - '|UNKNOWN('
        GrantedAccess: '0x103800'
    filter_optional_sysmon:
        SourceImage|endswith:
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon64.exe'
            - ':\Windows\Sysmon64a.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

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