Registry Hive File Staged Outside Standard User Profile Path


Description

Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path. These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user's profile directory. Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting.

Query · sigma

selection:
  TargetFilename|endswith:
  - \UsrClass.dat
  - \NTUSER.DAT
filter_main_usrclass:
  TargetFilename|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat
filter_main_ntuser:
  TargetFilename|re|i: ^C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\NTUSER\.DAT$
filter_main_system:
  TargetFilename|startswith:
  - C:\Windows\System32\config\
  - C:\Windows\SYSVOL\
  - C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Known false positives

  • Backup or profile migration software
  • Forensic acquisition tools
Raw source Registry Hive File Staged Outside Standard User Profile Path · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Registry Hive File Staged Outside Standard User Profile Path
id: a7f3c891-2e4d-4b6a-9f8c-d5e2a1b04c73
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path.
    These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user's profile directory.
    Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings
    for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting.
references:
    - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive
    - https://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-07-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1548
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003
logsource:
    category: file_event
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '\UsrClass.dat'
            - '\NTUSER.DAT'
    filter_main_usrclass:
        TargetFilename|endswith: '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat'
    filter_main_ntuser:
        TargetFilename|re|i: '^C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\NTUSER\.DAT$'
    filter_main_system:
        TargetFilename|startswith:
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\config\'
            - 'C:\Windows\SYSVOL\'
            - 'C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Backup or profile migration software
    - Forensic acquisition tools
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_registry_hive_file_creation/info.yml

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