Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32


Description

Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.

Query · sigma

selection:
  ParentImage|endswith:
  - \cmd.exe
  - \cscript.exe
  - \mshta.exe
  - \powershell_ise.exe
  - \powershell.exe
  - \pwsh.exe
  - \wscript.exe
  Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe
filter_main_rpcproxy:
  ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
  CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Known false positives

  • Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary
  • Some legitimate Windows services
Raw source Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32
id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22
related:
    - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d
      type: obsolete
status: test
description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html
    - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-26
tags:
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1218.010
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ParentImage|endswith:
            - '\cmd.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
            - '\powershell_ise.exe'
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
            - '\wscript.exe'
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
    filter_main_rpcproxy:
        ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
        CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary
    - Some legitimate Windows services
level: medium # Can be reduced to low if you experience a ton of FP

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