Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA


Description

Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories

Query · sigma

selection_exec:
  Image|endswith:
  - \wscript.exe
  - \cscript.exe
  - \mshta.exe
selection_paths:
  CommandLine|contains:
  - :\Perflogs\
  - :\Temp\
  - :\Tmp\
  - :\Users\Public\
  - :\Windows\Temp\
  - \AppData\Local\Temp\
  - \AppData\Roaming\Temp\
  - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\
  - \Temporary Internet
  - \Windows\Temp
  - '%LocalAppData%\Temp\'
  - '%TEMP%'
  - '%TMP%'
selection_ext:
  CommandLine|contains:
  - .hta
  - .js
  - .jse
  - .vba
  - .vbe
  - .vbs
  - .wsf
  - .wsh
condition: all of selection_*

Known false positives

  • Some installers might generate a similar behavior. An initial baseline is required
Raw source Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA · Sigma
Esc
Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA
id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846
related:
    - id: 1e33157c-53b1-41ad-bbcc-780b80b58288
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/
    - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/
author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Dave Johnson
date: 2019-01-16
modified: 2026-02-17
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1059.005
    - attack.t1059.007
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_exec:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\wscript.exe'
            - '\cscript.exe'
            - '\mshta.exe'
    selection_paths:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Tmp\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Roaming\Temp\'
            - '\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
            - '\Windows\Temp'
            - '%LocalAppData%\Temp\'
            - '%TEMP%'
            - '%TMP%'
    selection_ext:
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '.hta'
            - '.js'
            - '.jse'
            - '.vba'
            - '.vbe'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers might generate a similar behavior. An initial baseline is required
level: medium

Detection rules belong to the projects that publish them and remain under their own licenses. This site indexes and links to them; it claims no rights in them.