Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder

Description

Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains.

Query · sigma

selection_paths:
  Image|contains:
  - :\$Recycle.bin
  - :\Perflogs\
  - :\Temp\
  - :\Users\Default\
  - :\Users\Public\
  - :\Windows\Fonts\
  - :\Windows\IME\
  - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\
  - :\Windows\Tasks\
  - :\Windows\Temp\
  - \AppData\Temp\
  - \config\systemprofile\
  - \Windows\addins\
selection_domains:
  Initiated: 'true'
  DestinationHostname|endswith:
  - .githubusercontent.com
  - 0x0.st
  - anonfiles.com
  - bashupload.com
  - cdn.discordapp.com
  - chunk.io
  - ddns.net
  - dl.dropboxusercontent.com
  - ghostbin.co
  - github.com
  - glitch.me
  - gofile.io
  - hastebin.com
  - mediafire.com
  - mega.co.nz
  - mega.nz
  - onrender.com
  - pages.dev
  - paste.ee
  - pastebin.com
  - pastebin.pl
  - pastetext.net
  - pixeldrain.com
  - privatlab.com
  - privatlab.net
  - send.exploit.in
  - sendspace.com
  - storage.googleapis.com
  - storjshare.io
  - supabase.co
  - temp.sh
  - transfer.sh
  - trycloudflare.com
  - ufile.io
  - w3spaces.com
  - workers.dev
  - x0.at
condition: all of selection_*

Known false positives

  • Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
Raw source Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified. 
title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder
id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97
related:
    - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153
      type: obsolete
    - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d
      type: similar
    - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586
      type: similar
    - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464
      type: similar
    - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99
      type: similar
    - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f
      type: similar
    - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c
      type: similar
    - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794
      type: similar
    - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb
      type: similar
    - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8
      type: similar
    - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c
      type: similar
    - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7
      type: similar
status: test
description: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains.
references:
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665
    - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752
    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker
    - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a
    - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2018-08-30
modified: 2026-03-29
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1105
logsource:
    category: network_connection
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_paths:
        Image|contains:
            - ':\$Recycle.bin'
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Temp\'
            - ':\Users\Default\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - ':\Windows\Fonts\'
            - ':\Windows\IME\'
            - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Tasks\'
            - ':\Windows\Temp\'
            - '\AppData\Temp\'
            - '\config\systemprofile\'
            - '\Windows\addins\'
    selection_domains:
        Initiated: 'true'
        DestinationHostname|endswith:
            - '.githubusercontent.com'       # Includes both gists and github repositories / Michael Haag (idea)
            - '0x0.st'
            - 'anonfiles.com'
            - 'bashupload.com'
            - 'cdn.discordapp.com'
            - 'chunk.io'
            - 'ddns.net'
            - 'dl.dropboxusercontent.com'
            - 'ghostbin.co'
            - 'github.com'
            - 'glitch.me'
            - 'gofile.io'
            - 'hastebin.com'
            - 'mediafire.com'
            - 'mega.co.nz'
            - 'mega.nz'
            - 'onrender.com'
            - 'pages.dev'
            - 'paste.ee'
            - 'pastebin.com'
            - 'pastebin.pl'
            - 'pastetext.net'
            - 'pixeldrain.com'
            - 'privatlab.com'
            - 'privatlab.net'
            - 'send.exploit.in'
            - 'sendspace.com'
            - 'storage.googleapis.com'
            - 'storjshare.io'
            - 'supabase.co'
            - 'temp.sh'
            - 'transfer.sh'
            - 'trycloudflare.com'
            - 'ufile.io'
            - 'w3spaces.com'
            - 'workers.dev'
            - 'x0.at'
    condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
    - Some installers located in the temp directory might communicate with the Github domains in order to download additional software. Baseline these cases or move the github domain to a lower level hunting rule.
level: high

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