New MsDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (DMSA) Object Created


Description

Detects the creation of new msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount objects, which could indicate potential abuse of privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Windows Server 2025. The msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (DMSA) is a new object class introduced in Windows Server 2025 that allows administrators to delegate the management of service accounts to other users or groups. Attackers may exploit this feature to create unauthorized service accounts with elevated privileges, leading to privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment. It is highly suspicious if an msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount object is created without proper authorization or in an unexpected context, such as by a non-administrative user or outside of normal administrative workflows. So, it's a good idea to look out for accounts that are not typically responsible for service account creation to detect potential abuse of this feature.

Query · sigma

selection:
  EventID: 5137
  ObjectClass: msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount
filter_main_legitimate_accounts:
- SubjectAccountName: SYSTEM
- SubjectAccountName|expand: '%Administrators%'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Known false positives

  • Unknown
Raw source New MsDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (DMSA) Object Created · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: New MsDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (DMSA) Object Created
id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde
related:
    - id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6
      type: similar
    - id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects the creation of new msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount objects, which could indicate potential abuse of privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Windows Server 2025.
    The msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount (DMSA) is a new object class introduced in Windows Server 2025 that allows administrators to delegate the management of service accounts to other users or groups.
    Attackers may exploit this feature to create unauthorized service accounts with elevated privileges, leading to privilege escalation within the Active Directory environment.
    It is highly suspicious if an msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount object is created without proper authorization or in an unexpected context, such as by a non-administrative user or outside of normal administrative workflows.
    So, it's a good idea to look out for accounts that are not typically responsible for service account creation to detect potential abuse of this feature.
references:
    - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-dmsa-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-05-24
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.initial-access
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.stealth
    - attack.t1078.002
    - attack.t1098
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Account Management > Audit User Account Management, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\Account Management\Audit User Account Management, DS Access > Audit Directory Service Changes, Group Policy : Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Advanced Audit Policy Configuration\Audit Policies\DS Access\Audit Directory Service Changes'
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 5137
        ObjectClass: 'msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount'
    filter_main_legitimate_accounts:
        # Exclude modifications made by the system or legitimate administrative accounts
        - SubjectAccountName: 'SYSTEM'
        - SubjectAccountName|expand: '%Administrators%' # Add all members of the Administrators group to this placeholder
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
# The level is set to medium because while this is a significant event, it may not always indicate malicious activity. It requires further investigation to determine the context and intent behind the modification.
level: medium

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