DC Machine Account TGS Request from Non-DC Source IP


Description

Detects a Kerberos service ticket request (Event 4769) targeting a Domain Controller machine account's service (e.g. DRSUAPI) originating from an IP address that is not a known Domain Controller. Service tickets for DC machine accounts should only be requested by other DCs during legitimate replication operations.

An attacker with a valid TGT (obtained via PKINIT, overpass-the-hash, or stolen TGT) targeting a DC machine account's service from a workstation IP indicates preparation for DCSync or impersonation of a DC. Unlike Silver Ticket attacks (which forge the TGS and bypass this event), this rule catches attacks that go through the KDC legitimately.

This rule requires %dc_machine_accounts% and %dc_ip_addresses% to be populated with all known DC machine account names and DC IP addresses respectively.

Query · sigma

selection:
  EventID: 4769
  Status: '0x0'
  ServiceName|endswith: $
  ServiceName|expand: '%dc_machine_accounts%'
filter_main_dc_source:
  IpAddress|expand: '%dc_ip_addresses%'
filter_main_loopback:
- IpAddress:
  - 127.0.0.1
  - ::1
  - ::ffff:127.0.0.1
  - '-'
- IpAddress|startswith: 'fe80:'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*

Known false positives

  • Unlikely
Raw source DC Machine Account TGS Request from Non-DC Source IP · Sigma
Esc
Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: DC Machine Account TGS Request from Non-DC Source IP
id: e3f7c841-2a9d-4b5e-c018-d94b3e67f012
status: experimental
description: |
    Detects a Kerberos service ticket request (Event 4769) targeting a Domain Controller
    machine account's service (e.g. DRSUAPI) originating from an IP address that is not a
    known Domain Controller. Service tickets for DC machine accounts should only be requested
    by other DCs during legitimate replication operations.

    An attacker with a valid TGT (obtained via PKINIT, overpass-the-hash, or stolen TGT)
    targeting a DC machine account's service from a workstation IP indicates preparation for
    DCSync or impersonation of a DC. Unlike Silver Ticket attacks (which forge the TGS and
    bypass this event), this rule catches attacks that go through the KDC legitimately.

    This rule requires %dc_machine_accounts% and %dc_ip_addresses% to be populated with
    all known DC machine account names and DC IP addresses respectively.
references:
    - https://github.com/aniqfakhrul/CVE-2026-54121
    - https://gist.github.com/H0j3n/a5ef2609b5f2944ac2390a191a534c26
    - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-54121
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4769
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2026-07-29
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.lateral-movement
    - attack.t1550.003
    - attack.t1558.003
    - cve.2026-54121
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4769
        Status: '0x0'
        ServiceName|endswith: '$'
        ServiceName|expand: '%dc_machine_accounts%' # should be populated with all known DC machine account names
    filter_main_dc_source:
        IpAddress|expand: '%dc_ip_addresses%'
    filter_main_loopback:
        - IpAddress:
              - '127.0.0.1'
              - '::1'
              - '::ffff:127.0.0.1'
              - '-'
        - IpAddress|startswith: 'fe80:'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Unlikely
level: high

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