Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege


Description

Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.

Query · sigma

selection_1:
  EventID: 4673
  PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege
  Service: '-'
filter_main_exact:
  ProcessName:
  - C:\Windows\explorer.exe
  - C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe
  - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe
  - C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe
filter_optional_others:
  ProcessName|endswith:
  - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe
  - \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe
  - \procexp.exe
  - \procexp64.exe
  - \procexp64a.exe
  - \procmon.exe
  - \procmon64.exe
  - \procmon64a.exe
filter_main_startswith:
  ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft
filter_optional_dropbox:
  ProcessName|startswith:
  - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\
  - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\
  ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe
condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*

Known false positives

  • Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
Raw source Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege · Sigma
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Published by SigmaHQ/sigma ↗, licensed under Detection Rule License 1.1 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege
id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
status: test
description: |
    Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver.
    With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode.
    This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers.
    If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers.
    This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
references:
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
date: 2019-04-08
modified: 2026-06-29
tags:
    - attack.defense-impairment
    - attack.t1685
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection_1:
        EventID: 4673
        PrivilegeList: 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege'
        Service: '-'
    filter_main_exact:
        ProcessName:
            - 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe'
            - 'C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
    filter_optional_others:
        ProcessName|endswith:
            - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe'
            - '\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe'
            - '\procexp.exe'
            - '\procexp64.exe'
            - '\procexp64a.exe'
            - '\procmon.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
            - '\procmon64a.exe'
    filter_main_startswith:
        ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft'
    filter_optional_dropbox:
        ProcessName|startswith:
            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\'
            - 'C:\Program Files\Dropbox\'
        ProcessName|endswith: '\Dropbox.exe'
    condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
falsepositives:
    - Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used products and allowed tools. A good thing to do is to try and exclude users who are allowed to load drivers.
level: medium

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