Suspicious MSBuild Rename

name: Suspicious MSBuild Rename
id: 4006adac-5937-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002
version: 14
creation_date: '2021-01-15'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the execution of renamed instances of msbuild.exe. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and original file names within the Endpoint data model. This activity is significant because msbuild.exe is a legitimate tool often abused by attackers to execute malicious code while evading detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |-
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
      WHERE Processes.process_name!=msbuild.exe
        AND
        Processes.original_file_name=MSBuild.exe
      BY Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
         Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
         Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
         Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid
         Processes.process_hash Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level
         Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.user
         Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `suspicious_msbuild_rename_filter`
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use a moved copy of msbuild, triggering a false positive.
references:
    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msbuild/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1127.001/T1127.001.md
    - https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild/
analytic_story:
    - Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution MSBuild
    - Masquerading - Rename System Utilities
    - Living Off The Land
    - Cobalt Strike
    - BlackByte Ransomware
    - Graceful Wipe Out Attack
    - Storm-2460 CLFS Zero Day Exploitation
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1036.003
    - T1127.001
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1127.001/windows-sysmon.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit