Cross-source coverage
T1036.003 / ATT&CK
Masquerading: Rename Legitimate Utilities
57 rules across 6 sources.
1 deprecated hidden · include
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may rename legitimate / system utilities to try to evade security mechanisms concerning the usage of those utilities. Security monitoring and control mechanisms may be in place for legitimate utilities adversaries are capable of abusing, including both built-in binaries and tools such as PSExec, AutoHotKey, and IronPython. It may be possible to bypass those security mechanisms by renaming the utility prior to utilization (ex: rename rundll32.exe). An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is copied or moved to a different directory and renamed to avoid detections based on these utilities executing from non-standard paths.
- Tactics
- Stealth
- Platforms
- Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SysmonEDR:AMSImacos:unifiedlogmacos:endpointsecurityfs:fileeventsauditd:SYSCALLlinux:osquerylinux:syslog
How MITRE says to detect it DET0005
Renamed Legitimate Utility Execution with Metadata Mismatch and Suspicious Path
Windows Analytic 0012
Execution of binaries where the on-disk filename does not match PE metadata such as OriginalFilename or InternalName. Often observed with renamed LOLBAS or system binaries like rundll32, powershell, or psexec.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11EDR:AMSINone
macOS Analytic 0013
Execution of renamed or relocated native macOS utilities with uncommon names or non-default paths (e.g., renamed `osascript`, `bash`, or `curl`).
macos:unifiedlogsubsystem=com.apple.processmacos:endpointsecurityES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXECfs:fileevents/var/log/quarantine.log
Linux Analytic 0014
Execution of renamed common utilities (e.g., `bash`, `nc`, `python`, `sh`) from atypical directories or with names intended to deceive defenders or EDRs.
auditd:SYSCALLexecvelinux:osqueryevent-basedlinux:syslogcron activity
SigmaHQ/sigma
27 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| File Download Via Bitsadmin To A Suspicious Target Folder | High | Sigma |
| File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin | High | Sigma |
| LOL-Binary Copied From System Directory | High | Sigma |
| Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries | High | Sigma |
| Potential WerFault ReflectDebugger Registry Value Abuse | High | Sigma |
| Ps.exe Renamed SysInternals Tool | High | Sigma |
| Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - MacOS | High | Sigma |
| Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows | High | Sigma |
| Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution | High | Sigma |
| Renamed Jusched.EXE Execution | High | Sigma |
+ 17 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/detection-rules
11 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Credential Access via Renamed COM+ Services DLL | High | Elastic TOML |
| Renamed Automation Script Interpreter | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Microsoft Antimalware Service Execution | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Data Exfiltration via Rclone | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Kubectl Masquerading via Unexpected Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Renamed Utility Executed with Short Program Name | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Process Execution via Renamed PsExec Executable | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| System Binary Moved or Copied | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 1 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
splunk/security_content
10 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Execution of File with Multiple Extensions | Undefined | SPL |
| Suspicious Copy on System32 | Undefined | SPL |
| Suspicious microsoft workflow compiler rename | Undefined | SPL |
| Suspicious msbuild path | Undefined | SPL |
| Suspicious MSBuild Rename | Undefined | SPL |
| System Processes Run From Unexpected Locations | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows DotNet Binary in Non Standard Path | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows InstallUtil in Non Standard Path | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows LOLBAS Executed As Renamed File | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows Renamed Powershell Execution | Undefined | SPL |
elastic/protections-artifacts
5 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Renamed Third Party Administrator Tools | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Renamed Windows Automaton Script Interpreter | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Windows LUA Script Execution | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| System Binary Copied or Moved | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
Wazuh Core Ruleset
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Masqueraded CertUtil.exe used to decode binary file | Critical | Wazuh XML |
| Masqueraded CertUtil.exe with a different file name. Possible use to decode malware | Critical | Wazuh XML |
| Executed a renamed copy of wscript.exe | High | Wazuh XML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Copying system shell to /tmp with new name — potential masquerading (T1036.003) | High | Wazuh XML |