Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process
Description
The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher. This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.
Query · spl
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
count min(_time) as firstTime
max(_time) as lastTime
FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE
Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe"
Processes.parent_process = "*chrome-extension://*"
Processes.parent_process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
Processes.process_path IN (
"*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
"*:\\ProgramData\\*",
"*:\\Users\\*"
)
NOT Processes.process = "*chrome-extension://*"
NOT Processes.process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
NOT (
Processes.process_name = "claude.exe"
Processes.process = "*--chrome-native-host*"
)
NOT (
Processes.process_name = "IPS3.exe"
Processes.process = "* nativemessaging*"
)
by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter`
Implementation guide
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known false positives
- Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.
Analyst notes
Known false positives: Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.