Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process


Description

The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher. This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.

Query · spl

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
  count min(_time) as firstTime
        max(_time) as lastTime

FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe"
Processes.parent_process = "*chrome-extension://*"
Processes.parent_process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
Processes.process_path IN (
    "*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
    "*:\\ProgramData\\*",
    "*:\\Users\\*"
)
NOT Processes.process = "*chrome-extension://*"
NOT Processes.process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
NOT (
        Processes.process_name = "claude.exe"
        Processes.process = "*--chrome-native-host*"
    )
NOT (
        Processes.process_name = "IPS3.exe"
        Processes.process = "* nativemessaging*"
    )

by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
   Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
   Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
   Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
   Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
   Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter`

Implementation guide

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known false positives

  • Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned. Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.

Raw source Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Native Messaging Host Spawns User Writable Process
id: 8a42c414-eea0-419c-85b4-23ed03bb260d
version: 1
creation_date: '2026-11-16'
modification_date: '2026-11-16'
author: Onur Mustafa Erdogan, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: |
    The following analytic detects a process located in a user-writable directory (C:\Users, C:\ProgramData or C:\PerfLogs) that is spawned by cmd.exe acting as a Chromium native messaging host launcher.
    This activity is significant because attackers register a malicious native messaging host so that a browser extension can run batch scripts and binaries such as a bundled Python interpreter on demand, giving them a stealthy command and control and persistence channel.
    If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands, perform discovery and run further payloads under the context of the logged-in user. Known legitimate native hosts are excluded.
data_source:
    - Sysmon EventID 1
    - Windows Event Log Security 4688
    - CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search: |
    | tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
      count min(_time) as firstTime
            max(_time) as lastTime

    FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE

    Processes.parent_process_name = "cmd.exe"
    Processes.parent_process = "*chrome-extension://*"
    Processes.parent_process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
    Processes.process_path IN (
        "*:\\PerfLogs\\*",
        "*:\\ProgramData\\*",
        "*:\\Users\\*"
    )
    NOT Processes.process = "*chrome-extension://*"
    NOT Processes.process = "*\\pipe\\chrome.nativeMessaging*"
    NOT (
            Processes.process_name = "claude.exe"
            Processes.process = "*--chrome-native-host*"
        )
    NOT (
            Processes.process_name = "IPS3.exe"
            Processes.process = "* nativemessaging*"
        )

    by Processes.action Processes.dest Processes.original_file_name
       Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.parent_process_guid
       Processes.parent_process_id Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_path
       Processes.process Processes.process_exec Processes.process_guid Processes.process_hash
       Processes.process_id Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.process_name Processes.process_path
       Processes.user Processes.user_id Processes.vendor_product

    | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_native_messaging_host_spawns_user_writable_process_filter`
how_to_implement: |
    The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed.
    To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
    Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product.
    The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: |
    Software that ships its own native messaging host binary in the user profile or ProgramData and launches it through a cmd.exe wrapper may be returned.
    Validate the extension and the native host, then add the process name and command line to the exclusion list.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1176/001/
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/
    - https://specterops.io/blog/2026/08/13/chromium-extension-c2-persistence/
    - https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/native-messaging
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
finding:
    title: The process [$process_name$] was spawned by a Chromium native messaging host launcher [$parent_process_name$] on endpoint [$dest$] by user [$user$].
    entity:
        field: dest
        type: system
        score: 50
threat_objects:
    - field: process
      type: process
    - field: parent_process
      type: process
analytic_story:
    - Browser Hijacking
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1176.001
    - T1059.003
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1176.001/windows_native_messaging_process_spawn/windows_native_messaging_process_spawn.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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