Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name


Description

The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
| eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
| xmlkv TaskContent
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
| lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
| where isnotnull(tool_type)
| eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`

Implementation guide

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.

Known false positives

  • False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.

Raw source Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name · SPL
Esc
Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: Windows Scheduled Task with Suspicious Name
id: 9e9ab4e3-c9d0-4967-a197-6d755e8a7e6e
version: 9
creation_date: '2025-02-07'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Steven Dick
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the creation, modification, or enabling of scheduled tasks with known suspicious or malicious task names. It leverages Windows Security EventCode 4698, 4700, and 4702 to identify when such tasks are registered, modified, or enabled. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish persistence or execute malicious commands on a system. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain access, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log Security 4698
    - Windows Event Log Security 4700
    - Windows Event Log Security 4702
search: |-
    `wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702)
    | eval TaskContent = case(isnotnull(TaskContentNew),TaskContentNew,true(),TaskContent)
    | xmlkv TaskContent
    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime latest(Arguments) as Arguments latest(Author) as Author by Computer, TaskName, Command, Enabled, Hidden,Caller_User_Name, EventCode
    | lookup windows_suspicious_tasks task_name as TaskName
    | where isnotnull(tool_type)
    | eval command=TaskName, process=Command+if(isnotnull(Arguments)," ".Arguments,""), src_user=Author, user = Caller_User_Name, dest = Computer
    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
    | `windows_scheduled_task_with_suspicious_name_filter`
how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4698 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
known_false_positives: False positives are possible if legitimate applications are allowed to register tasks that call a shell to be spawned. Filter as needed based on command-line or processes that are used legitimately.
references:
    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/
    - https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2023/231213.pdf
    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/11/06/bengal-cat-lovers-in-australia-get-psspsspssd-in-google-driven-gootloader-campaign/
    - https://github.com/mthcht/awesome-lists/blob/main/Lists/suspicious_windows_tasks_list.csv
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$" user = "$user$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$" and "$user$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$","$user$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: "0"
    - name: Investigate schedule tasks on $dest$
      search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode IN (4698,4700,4702) | xmlkv TaskContent | search dest="$dest$" AND TaskName = "$TaskName$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
finding:
    title: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: A windows scheduled task was created with known suspicious task name [$TaskName$] on $dest$, this may be a [$tool$] indicator
threat_objects:
    - field: Command
      type: signature
analytic_story:
    - Scheduled Tasks
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Ransomware
    - Ryuk Ransomware
    - 0bj3ctivity Stealer
    - APT37 Rustonotto and FadeStealer
    - Castle RAT
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/winevent_scheduled_task_with_suspect_name/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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