Cross-source coverage
T1053.005 / ATT&CK
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
119 rules · 117 families across 9 sources.
1 deprecated hidden · include
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a.NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet Invoke-CimMethod, which leverages WMI class PS_ScheduledTask to create a scheduled task via an XML path.
An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.
Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from schtasks /query and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., Index value) within associated registry keys.
- Tactics
- Execution · Persistence · Privilege Escalation
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon
How MITRE says to detect it DET0441
Detection of Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation and Execution on Windows
Windows Analytic 1221
Detects the creation, modification, or deletion of scheduled tasks through Task Scheduler, WMI, PowerShell, or API-based methods followed by execution from svchost.exe or taskeng.exe. Includes detection of hidden or anomalous scheduled tasks, especially those created under SYSTEM or suspicious user contexts.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4698WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4702WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=13, 14
SigmaHQ/sigma
51 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation | Critical | Sigma |
| OilRig APT Activity | Critical | Sigma |
| OilRig APT Registry Persistence | Critical | Sigma |
| OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security | Critical | Sigma |
| OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - System | Critical | Sigma |
| Turla Group Commands May 2020 | Critical | Sigma |
| ChromeLoader Malware Execution | High | Sigma |
| HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation | High | Sigma |
| Important Scheduled Task Deleted/Disabled | High | Sigma |
| Kapeka Backdoor Persistence Activity | High | Sigma |
+ 41 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity
splunk/security_content
25 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn | Undefined | SPL |
| Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name | Undefined | SPL |
| Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD | Undefined | SPL |
| Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint | Undefined | SPL |
| Schtasks scheduling job on remote system | Undefined | SPL |
| Schtasks used for forcing a reboot | Undefined | SPL |
| Short Lived Scheduled Task | Undefined | SPL |
| Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory | Undefined | SPL |
| Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows Compatibility Telemetry Suspicious Child Process | Undefined | SPL |
+ 15 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/detection-rules
18 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack | High | Elastic TOML |
| Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Persistence via a Windows Installer | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Remote Scheduled Task Creation | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Remote Scheduled Task Creation via RPC | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 8 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/protections-artifacts
12 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Dual Persistence via Startup and Scheduled Task | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Potential UAC Bypass via IElevatedFactoryServer | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task by a Low Reputation Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task Creation by an Unusual Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task Creation from Suspicious Parent | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task Creation via Unsigned Parent | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task from a Browser or Compression Utility Descendant | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Scheduled Task from a Removable or Mounted ISO Device | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via Masqueraded XML File | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
+ 2 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity
Wazuh Core Ruleset
5 rulessocfortress/Wazuh-Rules
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Modify Scheduled Task with PowerShell (T1053.005) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task Exec from Registry (T1053.005) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task via Office Macro (VBA) (T1053.005) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task via XML Import (T1053.005) | High | Wazuh XML |
Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK Mapping | Undefined | KQL |
| Scheduled Tasks from AppData Created or Updated | Undefined | KQL |
chronicle/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| mitre_attack_T1053_005_windows_creation_of_scheduled_task | Informational | YARA-L |
panther-labs/panther-analysis
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Azure Automation Schedule Created or Modified | Informational | Panther Python |