Cross-source coverage

T1053.005 / ATT&CK

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

120 rules · 118 families across 9 sources.

Showing deprecated rules · back to the default

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may abuse the Windows Task Scheduler to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. There are multiple ways to access the Task Scheduler in Windows. The schtasks utility can be run directly on the command line, or the Task Scheduler can be opened through the GUI within the Administrator Tools section of the Control Panel. In some cases, adversaries have used a.NET wrapper for the Windows Task Scheduler, and alternatively, adversaries have used the Windows netapi32 library and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to create a scheduled task. Adversaries may also utilize the Powershell Cmdlet Invoke-CimMethod, which leverages WMI class PS_ScheduledTask to create a scheduled task via an XML path.

An adversary may use Windows Task Scheduler to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. The Windows Task Scheduler can also be abused to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement and/or to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as SYSTEM). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused the Windows Task Scheduler to potentially mask one-time execution under signed/trusted system processes.

Adversaries may also create "hidden" scheduled tasks (i.e. Hide Artifacts) that may not be visible to defender tools and manual queries used to enumerate tasks. Specifically, an adversary may hide a task from schtasks /query and the Task Scheduler by deleting the associated Security Descriptor (SD) registry value (where deletion of this value must be completed using SYSTEM permissions). Adversaries may also employ alternate methods to hide tasks, such as altering the metadata (e.g., Index value) within associated registry keys.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0441

Detection of Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation and Execution on Windows

Windows Analytic 1221

Detects the creation, modification, or deletion of scheduled tasks through Task Scheduler, WMI, PowerShell, or API-based methods followed by execution from svchost.exe or taskeng.exe. Includes detection of hidden or anomalous scheduled tasks, especially those created under SYSTEM or suspicious user contexts.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4698
  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4702
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13, 14

SigmaHQ/sigma

51 rules
Detection Severity Format
Diamond Sleet APT Scheduled Task Creation Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Activity Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Registry Persistence Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - System Critical Sigma
Turla Group Commands May 2020 Critical Sigma
ChromeLoader Malware Execution High Sigma
HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation High Sigma
Important Scheduled Task Deleted/Disabled High Sigma
Kapeka Backdoor Persistence Activity High Sigma

+ 41 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity

splunk/security_content

25 rules
Detection Severity Format
Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn Undefined SPL
Randomly Generated Scheduled Task Name Undefined SPL
Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD Undefined SPL
Scheduled Task Initiation on Remote Endpoint Undefined SPL
Schtasks scheduling job on remote system Undefined SPL
Schtasks used for forcing a reboot Undefined SPL
Short Lived Scheduled Task Undefined SPL
Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory Undefined SPL
Svchost LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Undefined SPL
Windows Compatibility Telemetry Suspicious Child Process Undefined SPL

+ 15 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/detection-rules

18 rules
Detection Severity Format
Persistence via TelemetryController Scheduled Task Hijack High Elastic TOML
Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell Medium Elastic TOML
Persistence via a Windows Installer Medium Elastic TOML
Persistence via Scheduled Job Creation Medium Elastic TOML
Potential PowerShell HackTool Script by Function Names Medium Elastic TOML
Remote Scheduled Task Creation Medium Elastic TOML
Remote Scheduled Task Creation via RPC Medium Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task Created by a Windows Script Medium Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious Execution via Scheduled Task Medium Elastic TOML

+ 8 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/protections-artifacts

12 rules
Detection Severity Format
Dual Persistence via Startup and Scheduled Task Undefined Elastic TOML
Potential UAC Bypass via IElevatedFactoryServer Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task by a Low Reputation Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task Creation by an Unusual Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task Creation from Suspicious Parent Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task Creation via Unsigned Parent Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task from a Browser or Compression Utility Descendant Undefined Elastic TOML
Scheduled Task from a Removable or Mounted ISO Device Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via Masqueraded XML File Undefined Elastic TOML

+ 2 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity

Wazuh Core Ruleset

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
Mshta loaded taskschd.dll module. May be used to create delayed malware execution High Wazuh XML
Process loaded taskschd.dll module. May be used to create delayed malware execution Low Wazuh XML
Task Scheduler: . · win.system.providerName = Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler, win.system.eventID = 106 Low Wazuh XML
Task Scheduler: . · win.system.providerName = Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler, win.system.eventID = 141 Low Wazuh XML
Task Scheduler: . · win.system.providerName = Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler, win.system.eventID = 142 Low Wazuh XML

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Modify Scheduled Task with PowerShell (T1053.005) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task Exec from Registry (T1053.005) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task via Office Macro (VBA) (T1053.005) High Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Scheduled Task via XML Import (T1053.005) High Wazuh XML

Bert-JanP/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Undefined KQL
Scheduled Tasks from AppData Created or Updated Undefined KQL

chronicle/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
mitre_attack_T1053_005_windows_creation_of_scheduled_task Informational YARA-L
T1053_005_windows_creation_of_scheduled_task Undefined YARA-L

panther-labs/panther-analysis

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Azure Automation Schedule Created or Modified Informational Panther Python

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