WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started


Description

The following analytic detects the execution of tasks registered in Windows Task Scheduler by monitoring EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed) from the Task Scheduler logs. This detection leverages Task Scheduler logs to identify potentially suspicious or unauthorized task executions. Monitoring these events is significant for a SOC as it helps uncover evasive techniques used for persistence, unauthorized code execution, or other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or the execution of harmful payloads, posing a significant threat to the environment.

Query · spl

`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN ("200","201")  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TaskName dvc EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`

Implementation guide

Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.

Known false positives

  • False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.

Raw source WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: WinEvent Windows Task Scheduler Event Action Started
id: b3632472-310b-11ec-9aab-acde48001122
version: 13
creation_date: '2021-10-21'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
status: production
type: Hunting
description: The following analytic detects the execution of tasks registered in Windows Task Scheduler by monitoring EventID 200 (action run) and 201 (action completed) from the Task Scheduler logs. This detection leverages Task Scheduler logs to identify potentially suspicious or unauthorized task executions. Monitoring these events is significant for a SOC as it helps uncover evasive techniques used for persistence, unauthorized code execution, or other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data exfiltration, or the execution of harmful payloads, posing a significant threat to the environment.
data_source:
    - Windows Event Log TaskScheduler 200
    - Windows Event Log TaskScheduler 201
search: '`wineventlog_task_scheduler` EventCode IN ("200","201")  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by TaskName dvc EventCode | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started_filter`'
how_to_implement: Task Scheduler logs are required to be collected. Enable logging with inputs.conf by adding a stanza for [WinEventLog://Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational] and renderXml=false. Note, not translating it in XML may require a proper extraction of specific items in the Message.
known_false_positives: False positives will be present. Filter based on ActionName paths or specify keywords of interest.
references:
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1053.005/T1053.005.md
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/
analytic_story:
    - SolarWinds WHD RCE Post Exploitation
    - IcedID
    - BlackSuit Ransomware
    - Windows Persistence Techniques
    - Prestige Ransomware
    - Winter Vivern
    - CISA AA22-257A
    - Amadey
    - AsyncRAT
    - ValleyRAT
    - SystemBC
    - Malicious Inno Setup Loader
    - Scheduled Tasks
    - Data Destruction
    - CISA AA24-241A
    - DarkCrystal RAT
    - Qakbot
    - Sandworm Tools
    - Industroyer2
    - PlugX
    - Remcos
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1053.005
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1053.005/winevent_windows_task_scheduler_event_action_started/windows-xml.log
          source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational
          sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
      test_type: unit

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