MacOS plutil


Description

The following analytic detects the usage of the plutil command to modify plist files on macOS systems. It leverages osquery to monitor process events, specifically looking for executions of /usr/bin/plutil. This activity is significant because adversaries can use plutil to alter plist files, potentially adding malicious binaries or command-line arguments that execute upon user logon or system startup. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistence, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the system's security.

Query · spl

`osquery_macro` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil
  | rename columns.* as *
  | stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    BY username host cmdline
       pid path parent
       signing_id
  | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
  | `macos_plutil_filter`

Implementation guide

This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.

Known false positives

  • Administrators using plutil to change plist files.

Analyst notes

Known false positives: Administrators using plutil to change plist files.

Raw source MacOS plutil · SPL
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Published by splunk/security_content ↗, licensed under Apache 2.0 ↗. Reproduced here unmodified.
name: MacOS plutil
id: c11f2b57-92c1-4cd2-b46c-064eafb833ac
version: 11
creation_date: '2022-03-04'
modification_date: '2026-05-13'
author: Patrick Bareiss, Splunk
status: production
type: TTP
description: The following analytic detects the usage of the `plutil` command to modify plist files on macOS systems. It leverages osquery to monitor process events, specifically looking for executions of `/usr/bin/plutil`. This activity is significant because adversaries can use `plutil` to alter plist files, potentially adding malicious binaries or command-line arguments that execute upon user logon or system startup. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistence, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a significant threat to the system's security.
data_source:
    - Osquery Results
search: "`osquery_macro` name=es_process_events columns.path=/usr/bin/plutil\n  | rename columns.* as *\n  | stats count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime\n    BY username host cmdline\n       pid path parent\n       signing_id\n  | rename username as user, cmdline as process, path as process_path, host as dest\n  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`\n  | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`\n  | `macos_plutil_filter`"
how_to_implement: This detection uses osquery and endpoint security on MacOS. Follow the link in references, which describes how to setup process auditing in MacOS with endpoint security and osquery.
known_false_positives: Administrators using plutil to change plist files.
references:
    - https://osquery.readthedocs.io/en/stable/deployment/process-auditing/
drilldown_searches:
    - name: View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
      earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
      latest_offset: $info_max_time$
    - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"
      search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
      earliest_offset: 7d
      latest_offset: '0'
finding:
    title: plutil are executed on $dest$ from $user$
    entity:
        field: user
        type: user
        score: 50
intermediate_findings:
    entities:
        - field: dest
          type: system
          score: 50
          message: plutil are executed on $dest$ from $user$
analytic_story:
    - Living Off The Land
asset_type: Endpoint
mitre_attack_id:
    - T1647
product:
    - Splunk Enterprise
    - Splunk Enterprise Security
    - Splunk Cloud
category: endpoint
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
    - name: True Positive Test
      attack_data:
        - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1647/atomic_red_team/osquery.log
          source: osquery
          sourcetype: osquery:results
      test_type: unit

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