Cross-source coverage

T1647 / ATT&CK

Plist File Modification

11 rules across 3 sources.

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the info.plist file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.

Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).

For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the LSUIElement key in an application’s info.plist file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as LSEnvironment, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.

Platforms
macOS
Telemetry
macos:unifiedlog

How MITRE says to detect it DET0109

Detection Strategy for Plist File Modification (T1647)

macOS Analytic 0306

Monitor for unexpected modifications of plist files in persistence or configuration directories (e.g., ~/Library/LaunchAgents, ~/Library/Preferences, /Library/LaunchDaemons). Detect when modifications are followed by execution of new or unexpected binaries. Track use of utilities such as defaults, plutil, or text editors making changes to Info.plist files. Correlate file modifications with subsequent process launches or service starts that reference the altered plist.

  • macos:unifiedlog write: File modifications to *.plist within LaunchAgents, LaunchDaemons, Application Support, or Preferences directories
  • macos:unifiedlog exec: Execution of defaults, plutil, or common editors (vim/nano) targeting plist files
  • macos:unifiedlog exec: Invocation of /usr/bin/defaults write or /usr/bin/plutil modifying plist keys

elastic/detection-rules

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
Creation of Hidden Login Item via Apple Script Medium Elastic TOML
Modification of Safari Settings via Defaults Command Medium Elastic TOML
Potential Persistence via Login Hook Medium Elastic TOML
SoftwareUpdate Preferences Modification Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious Apple Mail Rule Plist Modification Medium Elastic TOML

elastic/protections-artifacts

5 rules
Detection Severity Format
Initial Access or Execution via Microsoft Office Application Undefined Elastic TOML
Initial Access via macOS Installer Package Undefined Elastic TOML
Persistence via a Masqueraded Plist Filename Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Dock Plist Configuration Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Unusual Launch Service Creation via Unsigned or Untrusted Binary Undefined Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
MacOS plutil Undefined SPL

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