Cross-source coverage
T1036.001 / ATT&CK
Masquerading: Invalid Code Signature
12 rules across 2 sources.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may attempt to mimic features of valid code signatures to increase the chance of deceiving a user, analyst, or tool. Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. Adversaries can copy the metadata and signature information from a signed program, then use it as a template for an unsigned program. Files with invalid code signatures will fail digital signature validation checks, but they may appear more legitimate to users and security tools may improperly handle these files.
Unlike Code Signing, this activity will not result in a valid signature.
- Tactics
- Stealth
- Platforms
- macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Windows DefenderWinEventLog:PowerShellmacos:unifiedlogmacos:endpointsecurityfs:fileevents
How MITRE says to detect it DET0031
Invalid Code Signature Execution Detection via Metadata and Behavioral Context
Windows Analytic 0089
Execution of binaries with invalid digital signatures, where metadata claims code is signed but validation fails. Behavior is often correlated with suspicious parent processes or unexpected execution paths.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:Windows DefenderOperational logWinEventLog:PowerShellEventCode=4103, 4104, 4105, 4106
macOS Analytic 0090
Binaries or applications executed with tampered or unverifiable code signatures. Often tied to Gatekeeper bypasses, App Translocation, or use of unsigned launch daemons by untrusted users.
macos:unifiedlogsubsystem:syspolicydmacos:endpointsecurityES_EVENT_TYPE_NOTIFY_EXECfs:fileevents/var/log/install.log
elastic/detection-rules
11 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Masquerading as System32 DLL | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation | High | Elastic TOML |
| Untrusted Driver Loaded | High | Elastic TOML |
| Deprecated - Process Termination followed by Deletion | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Expired or Revoked Driver Loaded | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Masquerading as Communication Apps | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Startup Folder Persistence via Unsigned Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Communication App Child Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Unsigned DLL Loaded by Svchost | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 1 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/protections-artifacts
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Binary Masquerading via Invalid Code Signature | Undefined | Elastic TOML |