Cross-source coverage

T1057 / ATT&CK

Process Discovery

42 rules · 39 families across 8 sources.

Showing deprecated rules · back to the default

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software/applications running on systems within the network. Administrator or otherwise elevated access may provide better process details. Adversaries may use the information from Process Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.

In Windows environments, adversaries could obtain details on running processes using the Tasklist utility via cmd or Get-Process via PowerShell. Information about processes can also be extracted from the output of Native API calls such as CreateToolhelp32Snapshot. In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the ps command. Adversaries may also opt to enumerate processes via /proc. ESXi also supports use of the ps command, as well as esxcli system process list.

On network devices, Network Device CLI commands such as show processes can be used to display current running processes.

Tactics
Discovery
Platforms
ESXi · Linux · macOS · Network Devices · Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmonauditd:SYSCALLlinux:osquerymacos:unifiedlogmacos:osqueryesxi:shellesxi:authnetworkdevice:clinetworkdevice:syslog

How MITRE says to detect it DET0034

Detection of Adversarial Process Discovery Behavior

Windows Analytic 0095

Identifies adversary behavior that launches commands or invokes APIs to enumerate active processes (e.g., tasklist.exe, Get-Process, or CreateToolhelp32Snapshot). Detects execution combined with parent process lineage, network session context, or remote origin.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4688
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=10

Linux Analytic 0096

Detects execution of common process enumeration utilities (e.g., ps, top, htop) or access to /proc with suspicious ancestry. Correlates command usage with interactive shell context and user role.

  • auditd:SYSCALL execve
  • auditd:SYSCALL openat
  • linux:osquery Process State

macOS Analytic 0097

Monitors execution of ps, top, or launchctl with unusual parent processes or from terminal scripts. Also detects AppleScript-based process listing or `system_profiler SPApplicationsDataType` misuse.

  • macos:unifiedlog process launch
  • macos:osquery Process Context

ESXi Analytic 0098

Detects process enumeration using `esxcli system process list` or `ps` on ESXi shell or via unauthorized SSH sessions. Correlates with interactive sessions and abnormal user roles.

  • esxi:shell interactive shell
  • esxi:auth user session

Network Devices Analytic 0099

Monitors CLI-based execution of `show process` or equivalent on routers/switches. Correlates unusual device access, unauthorized roles, or config mode changes.

  • networkdevice:cli CLI command
  • networkdevice:syslog Admin activity

elastic/detection-rules

14 rules
Detection Severity Format
Potential Linux Credential Dumping via Proc Filesystem High Elastic TOML
Suspicious Dynamic Linker Discovery via od High Elastic TOML
Suspicious Memory grep Activity High Elastic TOML
Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery High Elastic TOML
Potential Linux Hack Tool Launched Medium Elastic TOML
Process Capability Enumeration Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious JetBrains TeamCity Child Process Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious MS Office Child Process Medium Elastic TOML
Deprecated - Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected Low Elastic TOML
Enumeration Command Spawned via WMIPrvSE Low Elastic TOML

+ 4 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

SigmaHQ/sigma

8 rules
Detection Severity Format
HackTool - PCHunter Execution High Sigma
Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE Medium Sigma
Recon Command Output Piped To Findstr.EXE Medium Sigma
Cisco Discovery Low Sigma
Process Discovery Low Sigma
Suspicious Process Discovery With Get-Process Low Sigma
System Info Discovery via Sysinfo Syscall Low Sigma
Suspicious Tasklist Discovery Command Informational Sigma

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

7 rules · 6 families
Detection Severity Format
Process Discovery attempt: 'ps' command executed Medium Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 12: RegistryEvent (Object create and delete) by · Process Discovery (T1057) Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 13: RegistryEvent (Value Set) by · Process Discovery (T1057) Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 14: RegistryEvent (Key and Value Rename) by · Process Discovery (T1057) Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Process Discovery (T1057) 2 variants Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Process Discovery (T1057) 2 variants Low Wazuh XML
Sysmon - Event 3: Network connection by · Process Discovery (T1057) Low Wazuh XML

Emerging Threats Open

4 rules · 2 families
Detection Severity Format
ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M1 3 variants High Suricata
ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M2 3 variants High Suricata
ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M3 3 variants High Suricata
ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with ps PowerShell Command Output High Suricata

Wazuh Core Ruleset

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Processes running for all users were queried with ps command. Medium Wazuh XML
Powershell executed "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot". Possible process discovery Low Wazuh XML
Powershell executing process discovery Low Wazuh XML
Powershell queried Win32_Process. Possible process discovery activity Low Wazuh XML

chronicle/detection-rules

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
fallout_rig_ek_delivers_raccoon_stealer Undefined YARA-L
possible_process_enumeration_sysmonwindows_logs Undefined YARA-L

elastic/protections-artifacts

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Discovery of GitHub Actions Runner Process PID Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Reading of procfs Maps File Undefined Elastic TOML

splunk/security_content

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Windows Process Commandline Discovery Undefined SPL

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