Cross-source coverage
T1080 / ATT&CK
Taint Shared Content
3 rules across 2 sources.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.
A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory.LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious.LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts.
Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to,.EXE,.DLL,.SCR,.BAT, and/or.VBS.
- Tactics
- Lateral Movement
- Platforms
- Windows · SaaS · Linux · macOS · Office Suite
- Telemetry
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WinEventLog:SysmonWinEventLog:Securityauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowfs:fseventsmacos:unifiedloggcp:workspaceauditm365:unifiedm365:defender
How MITRE says to detect it DET0471
Detection of Tainted Content Written to Shared Storage
Windows Analytic 1298
Detects adversary tampering of shared directories via file drops (e.g., malicious LNK, EXE, VBS) followed by user execution or suspicious network activity.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=5145
Linux Analytic 1299
Detects script or binary modification within shared NFS/SMB directories followed by process execution from those paths.
auditd:SYSCALLwriteNSM:Flowsmb_files.log
macOS Analytic 1300
Detects modification of shared network folders via.app bundles or scripting files with hidden extensions (e.g., double extensions like docx.app).
fs:fseventsDirectory events (kFSEventStreamEventFlagItemCreated)macos:unifiedlogfile writes
SaaS Analytic 1301
Detects upload of malicious or unusual file types into cloud-shared folders, followed by user downloads or interactions.
gcp:workspaceauditdrive.activity logsm365:unifiedFileUploaded, FileAccessed
Office Suite Analytic 1302
Detects embedded macros or scripts added to shared documents or use of external references to execute code.
m365:defenderOfficeTelemetry or DLP
elastic/detection-rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| M365 OneDrive Malware File Upload | High | Elastic TOML |
| M365 SharePoint Malware File Detected | High | Elastic TOML |
chronicle/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| ursnif_trojan_detection_cmd_obfuscation | Undefined | YARA-L |