Cross-source coverage
T1102.002 / ATT&CK
Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
20 rules across 5 sources.
Showing atomic-IOC rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service as a means for sending commands to and receiving output from a compromised system over the Web service channel. Compromised systems may leverage popular websites and social media to host command and control (C2) instructions. Those infected systems can then send the output from those commands back over that Web service channel. The return traffic may occur in a variety of ways, depending on the Web service being utilized. For example, the return traffic may take the form of the compromised system posting a comment on a forum, issuing a pull request to development project, updating a document hosted on a Web service, or by sending a Tweet.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
- Tactics
- Command and Control
- Platforms
- ESXi · Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:Sysmonetw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINetauditd:SYSCALLNSM:Flowmacos:unifiedlogNSM:Connections
How MITRE says to detect it DET0035
Detect Bidirectional Web Service C2 Channels via Process & Network Correlation
Windows Analytic 0100
Suspicious processes initiating encrypted HTTPS connections to common web service domains, followed by abnormal data upload behavior or automated posting behavior indicative of C2 bidirectional traffic.
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1etw:Microsoft-Windows-WinINetHTTPS Inspection
Linux Analytic 0101
Non-interactive system processes making encrypted HTTPS connections to well-known web services followed by high outbound traffic volume or scripted upload patterns.
auditd:SYSCALLexecveNSM:Flowconn.logNSM:Flowssl.log
macOS Analytic 0102
Scripting engines (e.g., osascript, Python) initiating HTTPS requests to social media or content-sharing platforms, paired with automated response handling indicative of two-way communication.
macos:unifiedloglog stream --info --predicate 'subsystem == "com.apple.cfprefsd"'NSM:Connectionsweb domain alerts
elastic/detection-rules
10 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Google Calendar C2 via Script Interpreter | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Etherhiding C2 via Blockchain Connection | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Curl to Google App Script Endpoint | High | Elastic TOML |
| AWS CLI Command with Custom Endpoint URL | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Connection to Common Large Language Model Endpoints | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Linux Telegram API Request | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Connection to Commonly Abused Web Services | Low | Elastic TOML |
| DNS Request to Suspicious Top Level Domain | Low | Elastic TOML |
| Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity | Low | Elastic TOML |
| Statistical Model Detected C2 Beaconing Activity with High Confidence | Low | Elastic TOML |
SigmaHQ/sigma
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Github Self-Hosted Runner Execution | Medium | Sigma |
| Potentially Suspicious Azure Front Door Connection | Medium | Sigma |
| Telegram API Access | Medium | Sigma |
| Telegram Bot API Request | Medium | Sigma |
Azure/Azure-Sentinel
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| CreepyDrive request URL sequence | High | KQL |
| CreepyDrive URLs | High | KQL |
elastic/protections-artifacts
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Attempt to establish VScode Remote Tunnel | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Potential VScode Remote Tunnel Established | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Potential Telegram API Request Via CommandLine | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows DNS Query Request by Telegram Bot API | Undefined | SPL |