Cross-source coverage
T1208 / ATT&CK
Kerberoasting
ATT&CK has retired this technique. Rules still tag it; the current id is T1558.003 Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting.
1 rule across 1 source.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Service principal names (SPNs) are used to uniquely identify each instance of a Windows service. To enable authentication, Kerberos requires that SPNs be associated with at least one service logon account (an account specifically tasked with running a service ).
Adversaries possessing a valid Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT) may request one or more Kerberos ticket-granting service (TGS) service tickets for any SPN from a domain controller (DC). Portions of these tickets may be encrypted with the RC4 algorithm, meaning the Kerberos 5 TGS-REP etype 23 hash of the service account associated with the SPN is used as the private key and is thus vulnerable to offline Brute Force attacks that may expose plaintext credentials.
This same attack could be executed using service tickets captured from network traffic.
Cracked hashes may enable Persistence, Privilege Escalation, and Lateral Movement via access to Valid Accounts.
- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Platforms
- Windows
- Telemetry
- —
chronicle/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| possible_spn_enumeration | Undefined | YARA-L |