Cross-source coverage
T1484 / ATT&CK
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
194 rules · 191 families across 8 sources.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.
With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:
- modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment
- modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources
- changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller.
- adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant
Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
- Tactics
- Defense Impairment · Privilege Escalation
- Platforms
- Windows · Identity Provider
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmonm365:unifiedazure:signinlogs
How MITRE says to detect it DET0270
Detection of Domain or Tenant Policy Modifications via AD and Identity Provider
Windows Analytic 0755
Adversary modifies Group Policy Objects (GPOs), domain trust, or directory service objects via GUI, CLI, or programmatic APIs. Behavior includes creation/modification of GPOs, delegation permissions, trust objects, or rogue domain controller registration.
WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=5136WinEventLog:SecurityEventCode=4663, 4670, 4656WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1
Identity Provider Analytic 0756
Adversary modifies tenant policy through changes to federation configuration, trust settings, or identity provider additions in Microsoft 365/AzureAD via Portal, PowerShell, or Graph API. Includes setting authentication to federated or updating federated domains.
m365:unifiedSet federation settings on domain|Set domain authentication|Add federated identity providerazure:signinlogsOperationName=SetDomainAuthentication OR Set-FederatedDomain
Sub-techniques with coverage
Counted in the 194 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.
Wazuh Core Ruleset
115 rules · 113 families| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Account Operators Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Administrators Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Allowed Read Only Domain Ccontroller Password Replication Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Backup Operators Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Certificate Service DCOM Access Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Cert Publishers Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Cryptographic Operators Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Denied RODC Password Replication Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Domain Admins Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
| Domain Controllers Group Changed | High | Wazuh XML |
+ 105 more from Wazuh Core Ruleset → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/detection-rules
31 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AdminSDHolder SDProp Exclusion Added | High | Elastic TOML |
| AWS IAM OIDC Provider Created by Rare User | High | Elastic TOML |
| AWS IAM SAML Provider Created | High | Elastic TOML |
| Domain Added to Google Workspace Trusted Domains | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Domain Federation Configuration Change | High | Elastic TOML |
| Entra ID Federated Identity Credential Issuer Modified | High | Elastic TOML |
| Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition | High | Elastic TOML |
| Application Removed from Blocklist in Google Workspace | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Attempt to Deactivate an Okta Network Zone | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Attempt to Modify an Okta Network Zone | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 21 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
splunk/security_content
24 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Active Directory Privilege Escalation Identified | Undefined | SPL |
| Azure AD New Custom Domain Added | Undefined | SPL |
| Azure AD New Federated Domain Added | Undefined | SPL |
| Microsoft Intune DeviceManagementConfigurationPolicies | Undefined | SPL |
| O365 Cross-Tenant Access Change | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous Deny ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous Group ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Dangerous User ACL Modification | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD DCShadow Privileges ACL Addition | Undefined | SPL |
| Windows AD Domain Replication ACL Addition | Undefined | SPL |
+ 14 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity
SigmaHQ/sigma
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Changes to Device Registration Policy | High | Sigma |
| Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition | Medium | Sigma |
| Modify Group Policy Settings | Medium | Sigma |
| Modify Group Policy Settings - ScriptBlockLogging | Medium | Sigma |
| New Federated Domain Added | Medium | Sigma |
| Okta Session Impersonation Granted From Untrusted Domain | Medium | Sigma |
| Startup/Logon Script Added to Group Policy Object | Medium | Sigma |
| Windows Default Domain GPO Modification | Medium | Sigma |
| Windows Default Domain GPO Modification via GPME | Medium | Sigma |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
6 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| operation. · office_365.Operation = Delete group. | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Group Policy Reg Change via PowerShell (T1484.001) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Group Policy Reg Change via reg.exe (T1484.001) | High | Wazuh XML |
| operation. · office_365.Operation = TeamSettingChanged | Low | Wazuh XML |
| operation. · office_365.Operation = Update group. | Low | Wazuh XML |
| operation. · office_365.Operation = Update user. | Low | Wazuh XML |
panther-labs/panther-analysis
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Wiz SAML Identity Provider Change | High | Panther Python |
| AppOmni Alert Passthrough | Medium | Panther Python |
| ZIA Trust Modification | Medium | Panther Python |
| GCP User Added to Privileged Group | Low | Panther Python |
Azure/Azure-Sentinel
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Federated domain added to Entra ID tenant | Undefined | KQL |
| Large Scale Malware Deployment via GPO Scheduled Task Modification | Undefined | KQL |
| Policy configuration changes for CloudApp Events | Undefined | KQL |
chronicle/detection-rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| entra_id_conditional_access_policy_modification | Low | YARA-L |
| detect_windows_password_policy_changes | Undefined | YARA-L |