Cross-source coverage

T1543.003 / ATT&CK

Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

122 rules · 121 families across 8 sources.

Showing deprecated and atomic-IOC rules · back to the default

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may create or modify Windows services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When Windows boots up, it starts programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Windows Registry.

Adversaries may install a new service or modify an existing service to execute at startup in order to persist on a system. Service configurations can be set or modified using system utilities (such as sc.exe), by directly modifying the Registry, or by interacting directly with the Windows API.

Adversaries may also use services to install and execute malicious drivers. For example, after dropping a driver file (ex: .sys) to disk, the payload can be loaded and registered via Native API functions such as CreateServiceW() (or manually via functions such as ZwLoadDriver() and ZwSetValueKey()), by creating the required service Registry values (i.e. Modify Registry), or by using command-line utilities such as PnPUtil.exe. Adversaries may leverage these drivers as Rootkits to hide the presence of malicious activity on a system. Adversaries may also load a signed yet vulnerable driver onto a compromised machine (known as "Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver" (BYOVD)) as part of Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.

Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.

To make detection analysis more challenging, malicious services may also incorporate Masquerade Task or Service (ex: using a service and/or payload name related to a legitimate OS or benign software component). Adversaries may also create ‘hidden’ services (i.e., Hide Artifacts), for example by using the sc sdset command to set service permissions via the Service Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL). This may hide a Windows service from the view of standard service enumeration methods such as Get-Service, sc query, and services.exe.

Platforms
Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:SecurityWinEventLog:Sysmon

How MITRE says to detect it DET0552

Detection of Windows Service Creation or Modification

Windows Analytic 1527

Detects creation or modification of Windows Services through command-line tools (e.g., `sc.exe`, `powershell.exe`), Registry key changes under `HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services`, and service execution under SYSTEM with unsigned or anomalous binary paths. Detects privilege escalation via driver installation or `CreateServiceW` usage. Correlates parent-child lineage, startup behavior, and rare service names.

  • WinEventLog:Security EventCode=4697
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=13, 14
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=6

SigmaHQ/sigma

47 rules
Detection Severity Format
CobaltStrike Service Installations - System Critical Sigma
CosmicDuke Service Installation Critical Sigma
Moriya Rootkit File Created Critical Sigma
Moriya Rootkit - System Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Activity Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Registry Persistence Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - Security Critical Sigma
OilRig APT Schedule Task Persistence - System Critical Sigma
Turla PNG Dropper Service Critical Sigma
Allow Service Access Using Security Descriptor Tampering Via Sc.EXE High Sigma

+ 37 more from SigmaHQ/sigma → showing the 10 highest-severity

splunk/security_content

22 rules
Detection Severity Format
CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation Undefined SPL
Impacket Lateral Movement Commandline Parameters Undefined SPL
Impacket Lateral Movement smbexec CommandLine Parameters Undefined SPL
Impacket Lateral Movement WMIExec Commandline Parameters Undefined SPL
Possible Lateral Movement PowerShell Spawn Undefined SPL
Randomly Generated Windows Service Name Undefined SPL
Services LOLBAS Execution Process Spawn Undefined SPL
Windows Admin Password Changed by Non-Admin Undefined SPL
Windows Bluetooth Service Installed From Uncommon Location Undefined SPL
Windows Cloud Files Filter Loaded by Uncommon Process Undefined SPL

+ 12 more from splunk/security_content → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/detection-rules

21 rules
Detection Severity Format
Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack High Elastic TOML
Persistence via WMI Standard Registry Provider High Elastic TOML
Service Creation via Local Kerberos Authentication High Elastic TOML
Suspicious ImagePath Service Creation High Elastic TOML
Windows Service Installed via an Unusual Client High Elastic TOML
First Time Seen Driver Loaded Medium Elastic TOML
Potential Privilege Escalation via Service ImagePath Modification Medium Elastic TOML
Remote Windows Service Installed Medium Elastic TOML
Service DACL Modification via sc.exe Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious ScreenConnect Client Child Process Medium Elastic TOML

+ 11 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/protections-artifacts

14 rules
Detection Severity Format
Driver Dropped by Untrusted Executable Undefined Elastic TOML
Kernel Driver Registered via NtLoadDriver Undefined Elastic TOML
Registry or File Modification from Suspicious Memory Undefined Elastic TOML
Self Service Persistence by an Unsigned Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Service Communication via Mail Protocol Undefined Elastic TOML
Service Installed by an Unusual Microsoft Signed Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Service Installed by Unsigned Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious API from an Unsigned Service DLL Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Execution via Windows Services Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Service ImagePath Value Undefined Elastic TOML

+ 4 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity

Wazuh Core Ruleset

12 rules · 11 families
Detection Severity Format
Volume Shadow Copy Service: COM+ database corrupted, writers will not receive events. Medium Wazuh XML
Bad return code detected during internal processing of the EventSystem service. Low Wazuh XML
Evidence of new service creation found in registry under binary is · win.eventdata.details = (?i)\.exe, win.eventdata.targetObject = (?i)System\\\\CurrentControlSet\\\\Services Low Wazuh XML
MS-DHCP: Service authorized in AD. Low Wazuh XML
MS-DHCP: Started. Low Wazuh XML
MS-DHCP: The log was started. Low Wazuh XML
MS-DHCP: The log was stopped. Low Wazuh XML
New Windows Service Created Low Wazuh XML
Powershell script executed "New-Service" command Low Wazuh XML
The Event log service was started 2 variants Low Wazuh XML

+ 2 more from Wazuh Core Ruleset → showing the 10 highest-severity

chronicle/detection-rules

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
win_susp_or_malicious_service_created Medium YARA-L
fireeye_red_team_tool__modified_impacket_smbexec_via_cmdline Undefined YARA-L
fireeye_red_team_tool__modified_impacket_smbexec_via_registry Undefined YARA-L
possible_impacketobfuscation_wmiexec_or_smbexec_utility_via_cmdline Undefined YARA-L

Azure/Azure-Sentinel

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Rare-process-as-a-service Undefined KQL

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
T1543.003 - Windows Service Configuration Modification via Registry (ImagePath, ServiceDll, Type, Start) High Wazuh XML

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