Cross-source coverage
T1564.001 / ATT&CK
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
46 rules · 45 families across 8 sources.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).
On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name. Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.
Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app. On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a.ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.
Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.
Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
- Tactics
- Stealth
- Platforms
- Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:Sysmonauditd:FILEauditd:EXECVEmacos:unifiedlog
How MITRE says to detect it DET0032
Detection Strategy for Hidden Files and Directories
Windows Analytic 0091
Suspicious use of attrib.exe or PowerShell commands to set hidden attributes on files/directories. Defender view: processes modifying file attributes to 'hidden' or creating files with ADS (alternate data streams).
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=11
Linux Analytic 0092
Creation of files or directories with a leading '.' in privileged directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin). Defender view: monitoring auditd logs for file creations where name begins with '.' and correlated with unusual user/process context.
auditd:FILEFile creation with name starting with '.'auditd:EXECVEUse of mv or cp to rename files with '.' prefix
macOS Analytic 0093
Use of chflags hidden or SetFile -a V commands to hide files, or creation of hidden files with leading '.'. Defender view: monitoring process execution and file metadata changes setting UF_HIDDEN attribute.
macos:unifiedlogExecution of chflags hidden or SetFile -a Vmacos:unifiedlogFile metadata updated with UF_HIDDEN flag
elastic/detection-rules
15 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Persistence via a Hidden Plist Filename | High | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid | High | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Process Execution Detected via Defend for Containers | High | Elastic TOML |
| Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Creation of Hidden Shared Object File | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| File Creation in /var/log via Suspicious Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Hidden Files and Directories via Hidden Flag | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| High Number of Egress Network Connections from Unusual Executable | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Potential Kubectl Masquerading via Unexpected Process | Medium | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd | Medium | Elastic TOML |
+ 5 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/protections-artifacts
11 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Attempt to Hide Files via Registry Modification | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Background Task Execution via a Hidden Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Creation of Hidden Shared Object File | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Execution of Hidden File from the Shared Directory | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| File hidden via Chflags | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| File Hidden via SetFile | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Hidden AppleScript Download via Curl | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Interactive Shell Spawned via Hidden Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious Execution via a Hidden Process | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
| Suspicious macOS Application Hidden Executable File | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
+ 1 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity
SigmaHQ/sigma
9 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Atomic MacOS Stealer - Persistence Indicators | High | Sigma |
| PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering | High | Sigma |
| Registry Persistence via Service in Safe Mode | High | Sigma |
| Set Suspicious Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE | High | Sigma |
| Displaying Hidden Files Feature Disabled | Medium | Sigma |
| Hiding Files with Attrib.exe | Medium | Sigma |
| Use Icacls to Hide File to Everyone | Medium | Sigma |
| Hidden Files and Directories | Low | Sigma |
| Set Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE | Low | Sigma |
chainguard-dev/osquery-defense-kit
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Programs running with a hidden current working directory (event-based) | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Programs running with a hidden current working directory (state-based) | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Programs running with a hidden file path or process name | Undefined | osquery SQL |
| Reveal launchd services which are located in a hidden directory. | Undefined | osquery SQL |
chronicle/detection-rules
3 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| mitre_attack_T1564_001_macos_hidden_files_and_directories | Undefined | YARA-L |
| mitre_attack_T1564_001_windows_hidden_files | Undefined | YARA-L |
| mitre_attack_T1564_001_windows_system_files | Undefined | YARA-L |
splunk/security_content
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Disable Show Hidden Files | Undefined | SPL |
| MacOS Hidden Files and Directories | Undefined | SPL |
falcosecurity/rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Create Hidden Files or Directories | Low | Falco YAML |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Suspicious use of mkdir to create a hidden directory (starts with a dot) | High | Wazuh XML |