Cross-source coverage

T1564.001 / ATT&CK

Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories

46 rules · 45 families across 8 sources.

Showing deprecated rules · back to the default

From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2

Adversaries may set files and directories to be hidden to evade detection mechanisms. To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (dir /a for Windows and ls –a for Linux and macOS).

On Linux and Mac, users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name. Files and folders that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable.

Files on macOS can also be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app. On Windows, users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a.ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.

Additionally, adversaries may name files in a manner that would allow the file to be hidden such as naming a file only a “space” character.

Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.

Tactics
Stealth
Platforms
Linux · macOS · Windows
Telemetry
WinEventLog:Sysmonauditd:FILEauditd:EXECVEmacos:unifiedlog

How MITRE says to detect it DET0032

Detection Strategy for Hidden Files and Directories

Windows Analytic 0091

Suspicious use of attrib.exe or PowerShell commands to set hidden attributes on files/directories. Defender view: processes modifying file attributes to 'hidden' or creating files with ADS (alternate data streams).

  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=1
  • WinEventLog:Sysmon EventCode=11

Linux Analytic 0092

Creation of files or directories with a leading '.' in privileged directories (/etc, /var, /usr/bin). Defender view: monitoring auditd logs for file creations where name begins with '.' and correlated with unusual user/process context.

  • auditd:FILE File creation with name starting with '.'
  • auditd:EXECVE Use of mv or cp to rename files with '.' prefix

macOS Analytic 0093

Use of chflags hidden or SetFile -a V commands to hide files, or creation of hidden files with leading '.'. Defender view: monitoring process execution and file metadata changes setting UF_HIDDEN attribute.

  • macos:unifiedlog Execution of chflags hidden or SetFile -a V
  • macos:unifiedlog File metadata updated with UF_HIDDEN flag

elastic/detection-rules

15 rules
Detection Severity Format
Persistence via a Hidden Plist Filename High Elastic TOML
Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid High Elastic TOML
Suspicious Process Execution Detected via Defend for Containers High Elastic TOML
Creation of Hidden Launch Agent or Daemon Medium Elastic TOML
Creation of Hidden Shared Object File Medium Elastic TOML
File Creation in /var/log via Suspicious Process Medium Elastic TOML
Hidden Files and Directories via Hidden Flag Medium Elastic TOML
High Number of Egress Network Connections from Unusual Executable Medium Elastic TOML
Potential Kubectl Masquerading via Unexpected Process Medium Elastic TOML
Suspicious Hidden Child Process of Launchd Medium Elastic TOML

+ 5 more from elastic/detection-rules → showing the 10 highest-severity

elastic/protections-artifacts

11 rules
Detection Severity Format
Attempt to Hide Files via Registry Modification Undefined Elastic TOML
Background Task Execution via a Hidden Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Creation of Hidden Shared Object File Undefined Elastic TOML
Execution of Hidden File from the Shared Directory Undefined Elastic TOML
File hidden via Chflags Undefined Elastic TOML
File Hidden via SetFile Undefined Elastic TOML
Hidden AppleScript Download via Curl Undefined Elastic TOML
Interactive Shell Spawned via Hidden Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious Execution via a Hidden Process Undefined Elastic TOML
Suspicious macOS Application Hidden Executable File Undefined Elastic TOML

+ 1 more from elastic/protections-artifacts → showing the 10 highest-severity

SigmaHQ/sigma

9 rules
Detection Severity Format
Atomic MacOS Stealer - Persistence Indicators High Sigma
PowerShell Logging Disabled Via Registry Key Tampering High Sigma
Registry Persistence via Service in Safe Mode High Sigma
Set Suspicious Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE High Sigma
Displaying Hidden Files Feature Disabled Medium Sigma
Hiding Files with Attrib.exe Medium Sigma
Use Icacls to Hide File to Everyone Medium Sigma
Hidden Files and Directories Low Sigma
Set Files as System Files Using Attrib.EXE Low Sigma

chainguard-dev/osquery-defense-kit

4 rules
Detection Severity Format
Programs running with a hidden current working directory (event-based) Undefined osquery SQL
Programs running with a hidden current working directory (state-based) Undefined osquery SQL
Programs running with a hidden file path or process name Undefined osquery SQL
Reveal launchd services which are located in a hidden directory. Undefined osquery SQL

chronicle/detection-rules

3 rules
Detection Severity Format
mitre_attack_T1564_001_macos_hidden_files_and_directories Undefined YARA-L
mitre_attack_T1564_001_windows_hidden_files Undefined YARA-L
mitre_attack_T1564_001_windows_system_files Undefined YARA-L

splunk/security_content

2 rules
Detection Severity Format
Disable Show Hidden Files Undefined SPL
MacOS Hidden Files and Directories Undefined SPL

falcosecurity/rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Create Hidden Files or Directories Low Falco YAML

socfortress/Wazuh-Rules

1 rule
Detection Severity Format
Suspicious use of mkdir to create a hidden directory (starts with a dot) High Wazuh XML

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