Cross-source coverage
T1132 / ATT&CK
Data Encoding
14 rules · 12 families across 8 sources.
Showing deprecated rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may encode data to make the content of command and control traffic more difficult to detect. Command and control (C2) information can be encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64, MIME, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
- Tactics
- Command and Control
- Platforms
- ESXi · Linux · macOS · Windows
- Telemetry
-
WinEventLog:SysmonNSM:Flowauditd:SYSCALLlinux:syslogmacos:unifiedlogesxi:shellesxi:vmkernelESXiLogs:authlog
How MITRE says to detect it DET0108
Detection Strategy for Data Encoding in C2 Channels
Windows Analytic 0302
Atypical processes (e.g., powershell.exe, regsvr32.exe) encode large outbound traffic using Base64 or other character encodings; this traffic is sent over uncommon ports or embedded in protocol fields (e.g., HTTP cookies or headers).
WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=3, 22WinEventLog:SysmonEventCode=1NSM:FlowUnusual Base64-encoded content in URI, headers, or POST body
Linux Analytic 0303
Custom scripts or processes encode outbound traffic using gzip, Base64, or hex prior to exfiltration via curl, wget, or custom sockets. Encoding typically occurs before or during outbound connections from non-network daemons.
auditd:SYSCALLexecveNSM:FlowBase64 strings or gzip in URI, headers, or POST bodylinux:syslogUnusual outbound transfers from CLI tools like base64, gzip, or netcat
macOS Analytic 0304
Processes use built-in encoding utilities (e.g., `base64`, `xxd`, or `plutil`) to encode file contents followed by HTTP/HTTPS transfer via curl or custom applications.
macos:unifiedlogbase64 or curl processes chained within short execution windowmacos:unifiedlogHTTP POST with encoded content in user-agent or cookie field
ESXi Analytic 0305
ESXi daemons (e.g., hostd, vpxa) are wrapped or impersonated to send large outbound traffic using gzip/Base64 encoding over SSH or HTTP. These actions follow suspicious logins or shell access.
esxi:shellbase64 or gzip use within shell sessionesxi:vmkernelOutbound traffic using encoded payloads post-loginESXiLogs:authlogUnexpected login followed by encoding commands
Sub-techniques with coverage
Counted in the 14 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.
SigmaHQ/sigma
4 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| DNS Exfiltration and Tunneling Tools Execution | High | Sigma |
| Gzip Archive Decode Via PowerShell | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Process Creation | Medium | Sigma |
| Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script | Medium | Sigma |
Emerging Threats Open
3 rules · 1 family| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M1 3 variants | High | Suricata |
| ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M2 3 variants | High | Suricata |
| ET MALWARE Outbound POST Request with Base64 ps PowerShell Command Output M3 3 variants | High | Suricata |
socfortress/Wazuh-Rules
2 rules| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| curl POST with base64-like subdomain detected — possible data exfiltration (T1568.003) | High | Wazuh XML |
| Sysmon - Event 1: Process creation · Suspicious PowerShell XOR (T1132.001) | High | Wazuh XML |
Azure/Azure-Sentinel
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| A host is potentially running PowerShell to send HTTP(S) requests (ASIM Web Session schema) | Medium | KQL |
chronicle/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| backdoor_detection_on_sql_servers | Undefined | YARA-L |
elastic/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Base16 or Base32 Encoding/Decoding Activity | Medium | Elastic TOML |
elastic/protections-artifacts
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Empire Stager Execution | Undefined | Elastic TOML |
falcosecurity/rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Decoding Payload in Container | Informational | Falco YAML |