Cross-source coverage
T1583 / ATT&CK
Acquire Infrastructure
629 rules · 340 families across 3 sources.
Showing deprecated and atomic-IOC rules · back to the default
From MITRE ATT&CK 19.2
Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain infrastructure that can be used during targeting. A wide variety of infrastructure exists for hosting and orchestrating adversary operations. Infrastructure solutions include physical or cloud servers, domains, and third-party web services. Some infrastructure providers offer free trial periods, enabling infrastructure acquisition at limited to no cost. Additionally, botnets are available for rent or purchase.
Use of these infrastructure solutions allows adversaries to stage, launch, and execute operations. Solutions may help adversary operations blend in with traffic that is seen as normal, such as contacting third-party web services or acquiring infrastructure to support Proxy, including from residential proxy services. Depending on the implementation, adversaries may use infrastructure that makes it difficult to physically tie back to them as well as utilize infrastructure that can be rapidly provisioned, modified, and shut down.
- Tactics
- Resource Development
- Platforms
- PRE
- Telemetry
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Internet ScanDomain Name
How MITRE says to detect it DET0895
Detection of Acquire Infrastructure
PRE Analytic 2027
Monitor for contextual data about an Internet-facing resource gathered from a scan, such as running services or ports that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Once adversaries have provisioned infrastructure (ex: a server for use in command and control), internet scans may help proactively discover adversary acquired infrastructure. Consider looking for identifiable patterns such as services listening, certificates in use, SSL/TLS negotiation features, or other response artifacts associated with adversary C2 software. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Monitor for queried domain name system (DNS) registry data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Monitor for logged domain name system (DNS) data that may buy, lease, or rent infrastructure that can be used during targeting. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control. Consider use of services that may aid in tracking of newly acquired infrastructure, such as WHOIS databases for domain registration information. Detection efforts may be focused on related stages of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Command and Control.
Internet ScanNoneInternet ScanNoneDomain NameNoneDomain NameNoneDomain NameNone
Sub-techniques with coverage
Counted in the 629 above — a rule tagged a sub-technique covers this technique too.
Emerging Threats Open
627 rules · 338 families| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (1jve .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (aamir-khan .site in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accaunts-googlc .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accountforusers .website in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accountforuser .website in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (account-gocgle .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (account-googlc .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accounts-gocgle .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accounts-googlc .com in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
| ET MOBILE_MALWARE Android APT-C-23 (accountusers .website in TLS SNI) | Critical | Suricata |
+ 617 more from Emerging Threats Open → showing the 10 highest-severity
elastic/detection-rules
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| AWS Route 53 Private Hosted Zone Associated With a VPC | Medium | Elastic TOML |
splunk/security_content
1 rule| Detection | Severity | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Cisco Secure Firewall - Rare Snort Rule Triggered | Undefined | SPL |